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THE AUSTRALIAN OUTLOOK

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Australia—A Comment

Nathaniel Peffer

I write, still in the soft glow of the memory of eight months in Australia, still in a warm nostalgia, so warm and mellow that even inland hotels are looked back on with affection, and greater love of Australia hath no man than this. But I do not write of the beauty of trees and desert and rain forest, the burning arresting red of the Macdonnells or the charm of the fauna (is it charm that an emu has?) or the gusty humour, warmth and friendliness of people, for this is not the medium for such considerations. I write instead of problems — problems much less agreeable to dwell on but, I am afraid, much more important.

First of all, it is out of no parochial pride that I say that none can understand contemporary Australia as well as an American, and this out of no peculiar insight not given to other men. For Australia to-day is much as the United States was, say, fifty years ago, especially in the West, then less developed than now. Both countries, Australia now and the United States then, were countries newly planted in an empty land. Both Australia now and the United States then, can be called not yet fully formed societies. Both had resolved to make for themselves new settings and a form of life free from the bondage of the forms and traditions of the old world. Both were and are egalitarian in spirit, almost fierce in devotion to the principle of class equality. Both had and have little respect for the old as such. Both had to pioneer, to battle against Nature to win sustenance, livelihood and then wealth, a task that breeds courage, determination, resourcefulness, independence of spirit and, perhaps, overconfidence. Both had and have the defects of their qualities, the qualities of their defects.

There is a remarkable similarity in the attitudes, the address to life, of the Americans then and the Australians now. An American born fifty or more years ago recognises the symptoms and feels himself at home. He can remember. First of all there is the exaltation of the practical not only as the highest good but almost as the only good: Natural enough, no doubt, in a people whose life is a daily struggle with immediate problems in the sphere of the material, almost insuperable problems on which livelihood hangs and demanding the fullness of energy. It is natural enough, but also it has some unfortunate effects, transitory, no doubt, but for the time limiting. The practical alone is worthy of serious effort, command of practicality alone worthy of the highest respect. The theoretical, the intellectual, the "cultured," are all held in relatively low esteem — not overtly depreciated but not

really worth much of the energy of a sound man. People given to such things are all right in their way, but they are hardly to be trusted to deal with important matters. This may seem exaggerated, but it is not actually so exaggerated as it seems.

There is education for existence. There is no real respect for it, no real acknowledgment that there is any need for it — unless, of course, it is of the “practical” kind. Book knowledge is all right but it doesn’t do much good. And certainly it is not deemed essential, again unless it is of the practical kind. One can detect this in almost all ranges of Australian life, not least in politics and labour organisation — employer organisation, too, for that matter. And certainly this was true in the United States fifty years ago. I remember when, at the age of 17, I let it be known in the small town in the West where I grew up that I was going east to a university, a business man I knew said to me in chiding tones, “But you’re a smart young fellow and you can get somewhere, why unfit yourself with all that theoretical stuff?” And he was not untypical.

We ourselves have got over most of that, of course. It was the theoretical, the long-haired fellows, who gave us nuclear fission, and all the largest corporations — electrical, aeronautic, industrial chemical — have highly paid research staffs working in pure science and even banks have research divisions manned by professional economists. Indeed, as it is our wont to move in wide pendular swings, we appear to be going to the other extreme. Now we almost seem to be coming to the point where Ph.D. degrees are required for all except waiters and washerwomen. And yet we still indulge in amused jibes at “egg-heads” — intellectuals, that is — who if not prone to dangerous thoughts are harmless and sometimes maybe a little silly. Is it not our academic theorists who keep disturbing the economy — “did they ever meet a payroll?” — by contrast with the sound, practical men who so masterfully directed the economy in the years before and after 1929? But we are getting over the old attitude, and we are the better therefor; so, too, will Australians get over it and be the better therefor. In neither case does it denote any peculiar trait in a people; rather is it a stage in the development of a young society.

There is another resemblance, one of a different order. Both countries have had to enter on a kind of reincarnation in a single generation. Both have perforce lost an enviable shelter and been precipitated into an unfamiliar and uncomfortable world. For the United States the oceans are not what they were; for Australia neither the oceans nor the British Empire and H.B.M.’s Navy are what they were. Both have learned that it makes for ease of mind and heart to be of no political consequence: Happy the land that has no foreign affairs. Isolation is no longer possible

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and may in itself be anti-social, but it was an agreeable situation. The United States, no doubt, shows the symptoms of its inner unease the more clearly of the two. Most of its present tension, its wild dashes off into all directions in international relations, the apparent tendency to go off the rails, to talk in many voices simultaneously and in contradiction of each other — these are manifestations of shock, shock at finding itself for the first time out in the world and in potential peril therefrom. Even more, it finds itself in a position of decisive power and necessity to make decisions, with corresponding responsibility, an obligation from which it has always been immune. In proportion as the United States has greater power and greater responsibility than Australia it is the more disturbed and more clearly shows its disturbance.

This brings me to a contrast rather than a similarity. I am thinking of the Petrov affair, for example, and of the poise, dignity and balance with which you have carried it out by comparison with the shrill melodrama in rather cheap rhetoric in which we have been engaged over a one-time ideologically errant army dentist who doubtless served the international conspiracy by emasculating a whole army corps by drawing the molars of all the officers. When an American contemplates together the conduct of the Petrov affair and the circus of our own recent Congressional investigations, he is inclined to squirm for himself and give deference to Australians for good sense, good manners and fair play.

But do not think too harshly of us. We are not really what we seem just now. True, our people have always been mercurial (in national affairs, that is, rather than as individuals) leaping in thought and feeling from extreme to extreme, given to heedless springing into the upper air; but we always settle, somewhat shamefacedly, for deep down we are sensible people with balance. The world can be less fearful of us than it is; puzzled, uncomprehending, disturbed it may very well be, but not fearful. We shall get our feet on the ground again. McCarthyism will not rule the land, McCarthy will become an unpleasant memory of something raucous and shoddy. But all this is itself just a symptom of the malaise brought on by our new and unfamiliar role in the world and the unaccustomed responsibility that goes with it. It is always psychologically satisfying to have something to blame for what one cannot help.

Another point, more of similarity than of contrast: Both countries, being Pacific Powers, are exercised over East Asia, the United States more than Australia. And I think (and I may say I have a Far Eastern background of many years) that both exaggerate the significance and the danger of East Asia — we over China, you over South-East Asia. What gives both China and East Asia the potentiality of threat is their actual, presumptive or potential affiliation with Russia. In themselves

they do not count for much yet. The countries of South-East Asia are unstable, weak, poor, technologically backward. Without Russia they are helpless for offense, even negligible. This holds in less degree for China, but it holds. China has plainly begun to develop materially. The development may be short-lived and it may not. With Russian aid — if that aid is large enough, which cannot be assumed — China may one day acquire real power and, with power, potentiality of threat. But that day is distant. As China stands now it has man-power and morale, but little else; and those do not carry threat against real opposition at a time when command of all the resources of the most recondite sciences is indispensable to effectiveness in economics, politics and war.

The real conflict is with Russia, the threat is from Russia, all South-East Asia being only an instrumentality, potent only as Russia is potent. If we cannot settle that conflict without war, China and South-East Asia will be auxiliaries to Russia but only auxiliaries. If we do settle it, it will be a long time before China and South-East Asia need be considered with alarm. When China can make weapons out of nuclear fission, can make guided missiles, can make jet planes in quantity and maintain them properly — then we shall have to take it seriously into account in the politics of war and peace — take it into account for itself and not as Russia's vanguard. Meanwhile both of us — the United States and Australia alike — had better keep our perspective.

I want to conclude with one more thing, apropos of nothing at all except life and myself. A few months after I returned from Australia I had an article in an American periodical, concerned mainly with Australia as a welfare state. The day after it appeared the New York correspondent of a Sydney paper rang me up at Columbia University. He wanted to know when I had been in Australia, for how long, and for what purpose, etc. Then he asked me whether I had liked it.

"Liked it?" I answered. "I'd go back to-morrow."

"You would?" he asked in an incredulous tone. He was English, I should add, and had never been in Australia. Perhaps the ancestral attitude still held.

I repeated firmly that I would. "And what is more," I added, "if I were to ring up my wife in Connecticut now and tell her we are starting back to Australia to-morrow, she probably would drink half a bottle of Scotch before evening." And I suspect she would have.

"May I quote that?" the correspondent went on. I said he might. I don't know whether he did quote it, but I do now.

. . . And maybe fate will be kind and that to-morrow will come.

The Simon-Stimson Myth

Japanese Aggression in Manchuria and Anglo-American Relations 1931-54¹

- I** *A Myth Makes History*
- II** *The American Version of the Legend*
- III** *Bibliographical Survey*
- IV** *The Stimson Refusal of September, 1931*
- V** *The Foreign Office "Rebuff" of January, 1932*
- VI** *Sir John Simon and "Non-recognition"*
- VII** *Stimson and Hoover*
- VIII** *The Verdict of History*

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

The myths of history die hard.

Sometimes this is a good thing — in more than the sense of the authors of "1066 and All-That."

Take, for example, the popular picture of King John's barons at Runnymede as 19th century liberals, if not also 20th century democrats. Modern historical scholarship has shown that this is almost entirely without foundation in fact. Yet the myth of Magna Charta did make history. It inspired both liberals and democrats in subsequent centuries, inside and outside England, to continue their respective struggles for political and social liberty. The Great Charter thus holds its rightful place in history as a landmark in the evolution of the political and social institutions of the English-speaking world. And this despite the fact that Magna Charta was essentially a conservative document the great bulk of the provisions of which were concerned with the preservation of the feudal privileges of a very small minority of the English people.

But the myths of history sometimes work in a very different way. Popular misconception of what happened in the past may seriously prejudice sympathetic understanding of the present.

It is with one such instance that this paper is concerned in discussing the myth of the Simon-Stimson discussions of 1931-1932 on the subject of Japanese aggression in Manchuria. Widespread and persistent misconceptions of the facts of this incident in history were to poison Anglo-American relations for at least a decade. Their unhappy influence is still with us in the second half of the 20th century. The myth shows remarkable strength to-day despite the demonstrable facts which have emerged from the researches of historians on both sides of the Atlantic.

1. Address given to the Australian Institute of International Affairs (W.A. Branch), 13th October, 1954.

II

The widely held American version of the Simon-Stimson affair, has had its followers in the United Kingdom as well as in the United States. Of the peculiar British cult of the myth more anon. Suffice it now to state the popular American interpretation of what happened in 1931-2. Briefly, it is that in 1931 the United States immediately recognised the danger of Japanese aggression in Manchuria. Through its warm-hearted, far-sighted and courageous Secretary of State, Mr. Henry Stimson, America is said to have offered joint action against the aggressor. Unfortunately, we are told, the cold-blooded British Foreign Secretary, Sir John Simon, with his limited legalistic outlook, and with, perhaps, a special concern for British economic and other interests in Japan, refused to move from behind the convenient protective mantle of membership of the League of Nations. The result was a walkover for the Japanese militarists. So began the drift from international co-operation towards international lawlessness — from Manchuria to Ethiopia, from Spain to Czechoslovakia and, finally, to Poland and Armageddon. In the Far East, in particular, the swing of Americans into isolationism in all matters concerning the western Pacific became intelligible. To quote the words of one of many Americans who discussed the matter with the writer in different parts of the United States at the end of 1939 and in the first half of 1940: "We made the offer in 1931-32. Your Sir John Simon turned us down. You can't expect us now to pull British chestnuts out of the fire, in China or elsewhere."

It's a far cry from 1940 to 1954 but the myth still reappears in American statements from time to time in somewhat modified form. A regrettably apt recent illustration was provided by the present Secretary of State, Mr. John Foster Dulles, in an address of June last to the Los Angeles World Affairs Council.

Mr. Dulles is quoted as having said:²

"In 1931 Japanese aggression began in Manchuria. Our government saw the serious implications of that move. Secretary of State Stimson proposed to other countries that there should be united action to restrain Japanese aggression. The answer, in Secretary Stimson's own words was a 'plain rebuff.' Matters went from bad to worse until finally there came Pearl Harbour and the Japanese sweep through South-East Asia and the Western Pacific."

The present Secretary of State is a well-informed student of Far Eastern affairs. It is also highly probable that the script of his Los Angeles address was vetted by some Department of State official. It is not therefore surprising that the statement quoted has some foundation in fact. Unfortunately, it omits certain vital facts; by doing so it gravely distorts the actual record of these fateful events of 1931-32.

2. The address was reproduced verbatim in the *Australian Press*, e.g. *West Australian*, June 29, 1954.

III

The really disturbing feature of such statements as that of Mr. Dulles in June 1954, and the many variants of his theme which appeared between 1932 and 1954 is that they persist despite the published work of American and British scholars, a short bibliographical survey of which repays attention.

Mr. Stimson's own account in his *Far Eastern Crisis* (New York, 1936) gave some ground for the criticism of British policy, as will be shown later. In the light of all the evidence we now have, the Secretary of State's 1936 account cannot be accepted in its entirety, but Mr. Stimson was careful to avoid some of the exaggerations already being attributed to his point of view by critics of Sir John Simon on both sides of the Atlantic. Some weaknesses in the original Stimson position, moreover, were pointed out by the American historian Professor J. T. Shotwell in his *On the Rim of the Abyss* published in New York in the same year as the *Far Eastern Crisis*. A 'ball to ball' description of events at the Geneva end had also been given as early as 1935 by the Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the Johns Hopkins University, Westel W. Willoughby in the 700 pages of his *The Sino-Japanese Controversy and the League of Nations* (Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press).

In 1940 another American historian, Professor W. S. Myers, removed one of the major premises on which the anti-British argument rested. Using some material which had already been published, in 1937, by two of President Hoover's Secretaries, Ray L. Wilbur and A. M. Hyde³, Professor Myers⁴ made it clear that, whatever the personal hopes and intentions of Secretary of State Stimson, the latter had been unable to give official effect to them by persuading President Hoover, in whose Administration he served and without whose support he could do nothing. President Hoover refused to allow his Secretary of State to commit the United States to anything more than moral suasion in restraint of Japan, whether Britain came in or not. This was to be confirmed by the second volume of the official *Memoirs of Herbert Hoover*, covering the years 1920 to 1933, published in 1952. The limits to Stimson's authority needed emphasis, for they had been largely ignored by A. Whitney Griswold, now President of Yale, in his well-documented *The Far Eastern Policy of the United States* (New York, 1938). Some additional facts regarding the American story from the Geneva end were also given by the United States Minister to Switzerland, Hugh R. Wilson, in his *Diplomat Between Wars* (New York, 1941).

So much for the contribution of some American historians and writers prior to Pearl Harbour. On the whole, as will later be demonstrated, these writings tended to discount the exaggerated claims made on Mr. Stimson's behalf. Ironical though it may seem, those exaggerated claims and the

3. R. L. Wilbur and A. M. Hyde, *The Hoover Policies* (New York, 1937).

4. *The Foreign Policies of Herbert Hoover* (New York, 1940).

more vigorously anti-British pre-war versions of the Simon-Stimson myth were encouraged by polemical attacks made upon Sir John Simon by British publicists.

The alleged limitations of the British Foreign Secretary's outlook had been severely dealt with as early as 1933 by Professor Arnold Toynbee in his annual Chatham House volume, the *Survey of International Affairs* 1932. Contemporary British Press and political opponents of the Government between 1933 and 1939 were less careful than Toynbee with their facts but they did not hesitate to improve upon the professor's polemics. It was Sir John Simon (to quote one left-wing British writer, Mr. John Strachey, in April 1938) who "by using to their full strength his immense forensic powers and, more important of course, by using the whole influence of Britain, stopped the League from taking action" against the Japanese in Manchuria. This was done, the writer went on, at a time when "we now know that . . . the United States Government, as Mr. Stimson then Secretary of State, has since revealed, was actually pressing the British for sanctions against Japan."

For this and a score of more equally pro-Stimson and anti-Simon interpretations of the events of 1931 and 1932 the reader may to-day turn to the 633 pages of *Democracy and Foreign Policy, A Case History. The Sino-Japanese Dispute, 1931-33*⁵ by Mr. R. Bassett of the London School of Economics and Political Science, published two years ago.

Before war with Nazi Germany turned British writers to other tasks, some defence of Sir John Simon and the British Foreign Office had appeared. Notable among these defenders was Sir John Pratt who had been adviser on Far Eastern Affairs in the British Foreign Office in 1932. On his retirement from the Foreign Office in 1938, Sir John Pratt entered the lists on behalf of his former chief. In contributions to the correspondence columns of the *London Times* on November 10 and 30 of that year he spoke with authority and was confirmed by Sir John Simon speaking in the House of Commons. The Pratt apologia, however, had little effect upon American opinion either at the time or when reprinted in the Appendix to his *War and Politics in China* (London, 1943). The next attempt to correct the prevailing anti-British interpretation of the Simon-Stimson incident of which I am aware was the distribution in mid 1940, by the British Library of Information in New York, of a mimeographed memorandum, *The Japanese Conquest of Manchuria — British and American Policies*.

At this stage I may perhaps allow a personal note to intrude into this bibliographical summary. At the end of 1939 I began a 13 months' survey of American opinion on Pacific affairs. It took the form of a non-statistical analysis of the opinions of a cross-section of Americans of different occupational and income groups in different regions of the United States.

5. (London, 1952).

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During my first three months on the Pacific coast, based on San Francisco but ranging as far north as Portland and Seattle and south to Los Angeles, I became seriously disturbed by the frequency with which the Simon-Stimson episode was cited in justification of a policy of non-involvement and non-co-operation with Great Britain in the then rapidly deteriorating situation in the Western Pacific. When the substance of the statement already quoted⁶, about not pulling British chestnuts out of the fire in China or elsewhere, had been repeated by a distinguished political scientist from Leland Stanford, by bankers, pressmen, church leaders, university students and trade-unionists, I thought it worthwhile suggesting the desirability of an official rebuttal. It happened that my itinerary took me direct from Los Angeles to New York and Washington D.C., leaving the Middle West till late summer. In Washington I was able to press this point on the British Ambassador, Lord Lothian, from whom I had had many courtesies in London in 1932-33 when he was Secretary of the Rhodes Trust and I was a Rhodes Travelling Fellow in Europe. The desirability of some corrective in accessible form was also suggested to the British Library of Information in New York.

It was, no doubt, a case of *post hoc sed non propter hoc* but it was nevertheless with considerable satisfaction that I noted the appearance of the British Library of Information's "unofficial" memorandum in the middle of the year. (I may add that I did my best to speed it on its way to the right places!) While this document was not complete or in all respects a convincing statement it did dispose of some of the more disturbing features of the Simon-Stimson myth which had appeared on both sides of the Atlantic.

Then came Pearl Harbour, which silenced almost all opponents of Anglo-American co-operation in the Pacific, including, for the time being, even Colonel McCormick.

The postwar years have brought more substantial studies of the events of 1932. *Retrospect: The Memoirs of the Rt. Hon. Viscount Simon* (London, 1952) touches on one phase only of the controversy in a brief three-page comment which adds nothing to the information given by Sir John Pratt in 1938 and 1943. The most significant publication which directly involved one of the parties concerned was *On Active Service in Peace and War*⁷ by Mr. Henry Stimson and Dr. McGeorge Bundy of Harvard. This book, rather unusual in point of form, appeared in 1948 below the names of both men but was written by Dr. Bundy, except for an "Introduction" and an "Afterword" by Mr. Stimson. The declared aim was "to substitute a joint effort for the single-handed autobiography which he (Mr. Stimson) might have undertaken if he were a little younger."⁸ The impression gained by reading Dr. Bundy's "Note of Explanation and

6. See p. 6.

7. (London and New York, 1948).

8. Op. cit., p. 404.

Acknowledgement"—which the author confirmed in conversation with the present writer at Harvard in 1950 — is that the book represents Mr. Stimson's considered opinions of all his more important actions in public life, as, after due reflection and re-examination of all available material, including his own unpublished diaries, he then understood those actions in 1948.

On the particular question of Mr. Stimson's 1932 discussions with Sir John Simon, *On Active Service* gives in certain respects a revised version of the former Secretary of State's *Far Eastern Crisis*. To quote Dr. Bundy,⁹

It was not a story with a simple moral; indeed, one reason for Stimson in particular to reconsider the case was that in the years after 1933 there had grown up among many Americans a legend that, if he had not been blocked by the wicked British, Stimson would easily have brought the wicked Japanese to terms by bold and energetic action in 1932. It was not as simple as that.

The same year as saw *On Active Service* produced another American re-appraisal of the Manchurian affair. Sara Smith's *The Manchurian Crisis 1931-32* (New York, 1948) was even more outspoken in condemning the conventional American interpretation of the Simon-Stimson affair. Highly critical of Mr. Stimson's early attitude in September 1931 Dr. Smith also recognised the mistake of the British Foreign Office in January of the following year. Nevertheless she denounced

some of our self-appointed interpreters, journalists and radio commentators who have lost no opportunity to play up British failure to co-operate at this point until it is the one thing the vast majority of Americans remember about the whole affair.¹⁰

The first volume of the U.S. Department of State's *Foreign Relations of the United States 1931* had appeared in 1943. A short analysis of the bearing of the material in these 1931 volumes and of that in Volume III of the *Foreign Relations 1932* (Washington, 1948) was made by Dr. E. R. Perkins in his essay "The Non-application of Sanctions Against Japan 1931-32" in *Essays in History and International Relations* ed. D. E. Lee and G. E. McReynolds (Worcester, Mass., 1949).

The latest, and what would seem to be the most comprehensive survey has this year appeared from the pen of Dr. Richard Current of the University of Illinois. Dr. Current's book, *Secretary Stimson. A Study in Statecraft* (Rutgers University Press, 1954) has not yet reached Perth. Fortunately, the author has put the substance of his argument on the Manchurian question in the form of a 30-page article in the April 1954 issue of *The American Historical Review* (Vol. LIX, No. 3) under title "The Stimson Doctrine and the Hoover Doctrine."^{10 (a)}

The significance of this work by Dr. Current lies primarily in the

9. Op. cit., pp. 69-70.

10. Op. cit., p. 240.

10(a) The book, now available, adds little to the A.H.R. argument.

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fact that he not only had access to a microfilm copy of the unpublished Stimson Diary down to 1933 but was also permitted by Mr. William R. Castle, who was Stimson's Under-Secretary of State in 1932, to use the Castle Diary which is still in private hands. This is the more important as Castle was on terms of close friendship with President Hoover and was reputedly the leader of a pro-Japanese group in the State Department.

IV

This lengthy bibliographical survey of material available for objective study of the events of 1931-2 should at least dispose in advance of any excuse for responsible persons who to-day deliver themselves of sweeping and unwarranted generalisations regarding Anglo-American relations on the Manchurian question. It is quite another matter to try to present in a few paragraphs the positive conclusions which emerge from so much historical research and from the re-examination of the evidence of what was in fact a highly complex incident.

On two points, however, it is now possible to speak with confidence and indeed with some emphasis — on the events of September 18-22, 1931 and of January 7-11, 1932.

The first of these concerns that part of the Simon-Stimson myth which attributes to the United States Government both immediate recognition of the international significance of the Japanese incident in Manchuria in September, 1931 and prompt action to secure international action in restraint of Japan which might have nipped the situation in the bud.

Not only do the facts fail to support this oft-repeated claim; they indicate that the very reverse took place.

The Assembly of the League of Nations happened to be in session at Geneva in the third week of September, 1931. The League Council was due to meet on September 19 and the Mukden incident took place on the 18th. Both China and Japan were members of the League Council and the British delegation was led by Viscount Cecil, the veteran supporter of the League of Nations.

It is important to stress this latter fact. Lord Reading was Foreign Secretary in the new British Government which replaced the MacDonald Labour Administration on August 25. Sir John Simon did not become Foreign Secretary until after the General Elections at the end of October. As the League Assembly had been due to meet on September 7 Cecil was asked to take over in Geneva. It would seem that, throughout the September and October discussions on the Manchurian incident, Cecil had a completely free hand. During these months Reading appears to have followed Cecil's lead, in sharp contrast to the position at League Council meetings in November and December, 1931 and in 1932 after Sir John Simon had taken over as Foreign Secretary.

To resume the story: The Mukden incident was reported to the League Council on September 19 and was formally considered by the

Council on September 22. In diplomatic circles it was common knowledge that the Council would be asked to consider sending to Manchuria a Committee of Enquiry. It was therefore highly significant that Cecil should formally have proposed:

To communicate to the United States a statement of all the proceedings of this Council and of all discussions which have taken place within it. The United States Government will then be fully informed of what we are doing and will be able to take any action it may think right in connection with this matter.¹¹

This was done and the meaning was clear to all concerned, including Mr. Stimson. His Minister to Switzerland, Hugh Wilson, was in touch with him by cable and by transatlantic telephone. On this the evidence is unquestionable. It comes from both Geneva and Washington. Wilson wrote that while he was not a member of the League Council, "I might as well have been one." He was in constant conference with Council Members and was "dragged out of the Assembly to answer the telephone from Washington."¹² Stimson himself wrote in 1936 that, late on the evening of September 22, he had received a cable "reporting that the League was contemplating sending to Manchuria an investigating commission . . . They wished to know whether we would join such a commission . . . The following morning while I was considering the cable it was reinforced by a message through our Minister to Switzerland over the telephone . . ."¹³

The Secretary of State gave his answer in unmistakable terms. Impressed by the sincerity of the Foreign Minister, Baron Shidehara, he felt that any international action in restraint of Japan might play into the hands of the Japanese militarists. To quote Mr. Stimson's own words in 1936,

The Japanese Government had . . . for ten years given an exceptional record of good citizenship in the life of the international world. Shidehara was still in office. We knew that he had been labouring hard for moderation against the pressure of the army leaders in Manchuria. We had reached the conclusion that those leaders had engineered the outbreak probably without his knowledge and certainly against his will. It seemed clear to us that no steps should be taken which would make his task more difficult because certainly our chances of a successful solution of the situation lay in him.¹⁴

Whether Stimson was unduly optimistic in his faith in Shidehara is for present purposes irrelevant. It may be that the evidence before the Secretary of State was already sufficient to have prompted a different decision as to the relative strength of the Liberal Shidehara and his military opponents. If so, Mr. Stimson's judgement was seriously at fault. It has

11. Official Journal quoted by S. Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

12. *Diplomat Between Wars*, p. 260. Cited S. Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

13. *Far Eastern Crisis*, pp. 42-44.

14. *Far Eastern Crisis*, p. 3.

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indeed been argued that the Secretary of State leant too much at this point on the arguments of the pro-Japanese Castle as against the leader of the rival school of thought within the State Department, Stanley Hornbeck.¹⁵

This must remain a matter of opinion, but two points are clear. Stimson backed the wrong horse; helping Shidehara did not stop the Japanese militarists. Unfortunately the Secretary of State's reply to Geneva did block the proposed League Committee of Enquiry.

Dr. Smith gives a colourful impression of the effect of Stimson's attitude.

... Everyone who has been in Geneva for any length of time knows the *bise*, that cold northern wind which suddenly sweeps down from (the) Alps in the sunniest of summer weather, striking to the bone with a chill which the warmest of tweeds cannot keep out. So it was that day in September when the high hopes of the morning were blotted out by the black gloom which settled over League circles as it became known that the United States would not approve, much less participate in such a commission.¹⁶

Professor J. T. Shotwell put his criticism in these terms in 1936: Here, at the very outset, we come upon what was perhaps the fatal blunder of the United States, for it checked the only positive action which the League could take at the time, an action which had proved effective when it prevented the outbreak of war between Greece and Bulgaria . . . ¹⁷

Stimson himself refused to admit the blunder either in his *Far Eastern Crisis* or his *On Active Service in Peace and War*. As Dr. Bundy puts it in the latter work:

In 1947, reconsidering this first phase of the Manchurian affair, Stimson found it difficult to recapture the atmosphere which had made him so patient in the face of repeated acts of aggression. His original decision to support Shidehara by patience and reticence he thought sound enough and he would do it again.¹⁸

The furthest Stimson would go in 1947 was to say, through the medium of Dr. Bundy, that "perhaps he had clung too long to this hope."¹⁹

From the vantage point in 1954 it seems not unreasonable to suggest, however, that some of Stimson's later impatience for action against Japan in 1932, after it was clear that the Japanese militarists had the bit between their teeth, might be explained by perhaps subconscious recognition that it was he rather than any other contemporary statesman who had been

15. When the Castle Diary has been published it may be possible to test this argument. Stimson insisted in 1936 that he did not recall "any difference of opinion whatever in our group in the State Department at this point." Dr. Sara Smith (op. cit., p. 31 n. 20) cites the "very different picture" given by Drew Pearson and Constantine Brown in their *American Diplomatic Game* (N. Yk., 1935) pp. 300-301. She states that her own inquiries (for which the sources of opinion "unfortunately cannot be quoted") confirmed the story of "a violent difference of opinion from the beginning" between Castle and Hornbeck. See also Current, loc. cit., *passim*.

16. The Manchurian Crisis 1931-32, pp. 49-50.

17. On the Rim of the Abyss, p. 244.

18. On Active Service in Peace and War, p. 77.

19. Ibid.

responsible for blocking the one attempt at international action in restraint of Japan which might conceivably have produced results because it came so early and would have involved a minimum of face-saving for the Japanese.

American policy in September 1931 may perhaps be summed up in the restrained language of the memorandum prepared in 1940 by the British Library of Information in New York for American circulation: Subsequent developments . . . should be viewed against this background of American non-co-operation in the critical early days of the Manchurian crisis, and in considering criticisms of British policy the general point should be remembered that it was America who hung back at first . . . The hesitancy of British policy early in 1932 can in part be explained by the extreme caution displayed by the American Government in the autumn of 1931.

V.

The second incident in the controversy regarding British and American action on the Manchurian affair concerns the events of January 7 to 11, 1932.

Here again the facts are clear. Having eventually decided that reliance on Japanese Liberal resistance to militarist pressure was futile, and after some backing and filling²⁰ in respect to co-operation with the League Council in November and December, 1931, Stimson took the initiative early in the new year. He decided to make a *démarche* by applying to Manchuria the distinctively American doctrine of non-recognition of the fruits of aggression.²¹ In this he sought the co-operation of Great Britain, France, and the other four governments who with the United States, China and Japan had signed the Washington Nine Power Treaty of 1922.

There is no question that this was a new, independent United States move. On January 7, 1932, without effective prior consultation with the Governments members of the League²² Stimson addressed an identic Note to Japan and China. The note warned both Governments, but in reality Japan, that

the American Government . . . cannot admit the legality of any situation *de facto* nor does it intend to recognise any treaty or agreement entered into between those Governments, or agents thereof, which may impair the treaty rights of the United States or its citizens in China, including those which relate to the sovereignty, the independence, or the territorial and administrative integrity of the Republic of China or to the international policy relating to China, commonly known as the open door policy . . .²³

20. Saar Smith, *op. cit.*, chapters IV, V, VI *passim*; Current loc. cit., p. 518.

21. Cf. the Bryan Caveat of 1915. Griswold, *op. cit.*, pp. 194-5.

22. Bassett, *op. cit.*, pp. 75-6.

23. Full text in Documents on International Affairs, 1932, p. 262. (Date there given as January 8.)

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The Secretary of State had informed the British and French ambassadors in Washington two days before issuing the Note and had indicated his hope that the British and French governments would take "similar steps."²⁴

The Foreign Office response represents what may be regarded as perhaps the low-water mark in British diplomacy between the two world wars. The British Government had been informed of Stimson's conversation with the British Ambassador in Washington immediately after it took place on January 5, though London did not receive the text of Stimson's Note to Japan and China until it had been delivered to those powers. The Foreign Office sent a courteously worded telegram to Mr. Stimson pointing out the complications of Great Britain's position as a member of the League²⁵ but their public response to the Stimson request for similar action took the form of a communique issued on the 9th. The official communique contained no reference whatever to the territorial or administrative integrity of China, and on the question of the open door it merely referred appreciatively to Japanese statements made since the Mukden incident in which assurances had been given that Japan would adhere to the open door policy. The document therefore concluded:

In view of these statements, his Majesty's Government have not considered it necessary to address any formal note to the Japanese Government on the lines of the American Government's note, but the Japanese Ambassador in London has been requested to obtain confirmation of these assurances from his Government.²⁶

The French, it was reported, interpreted the Foreign Office communique as an example of "British humour,"²⁷ but the joke was certainly not appreciated in Washington.

Indeed, if the British Foreign Office had wished to issue a diplomatic snub to the American State Department it is difficult to see how they could have done it more effectively. The apparent intention to do so was underlined by an editorial in the next issue of the *London Times* on January 11, commending the wisdom of the British Government in "declining to address a communication to the Chinese and Japanese Governments on the lines of Mr. Stimson's note." The editorial declared that it was not the business of the Foreign Office to defend the "administrative integrity" of China "until that integrity is something more than an ideal. It did not exist in 1922 and it does not exist to-day."

Some British apologists have attempted to minimise the importance of the Foreign Office communique of January 9. Mr. Bassett of the London School of Economics, in the work already cited, remarks that most of the indignation expressed by Mr. Stimson and others was directed at the *Times*

24. *Far Eastern Crisis*, p. 98.

25. J. T. Pratt, *War and Politics in China*, pp. 226, 275.

26. *Survey of International Affairs 1932* (London, 1933), p. 542.

27. *The Paris Correspondent of the Manchester Guardian*, January 11, 1932; quoted Toynbee, *op. cit.*, p. 542.

editorial which, he rightly insists, is not to be identified with the official communique of the Foreign Office. This is all right as far as it goes and one can sympathise with Sir John Pratt's comment, more in sorrow than in anger:

The Times has always shown uncanny skill in publishing its more unfortunate leading articles at the moment when they would be calculated to do the maximum of damage.²⁸

Mr. Bassett however goes further. He makes much of the fact that Mr. Stimson in 1936 in his *Far Eastern Crisis* did not then actually state that he personally regarded the communique as a rebuff to the United States. Stimson merely wrote, Mr. Bassett reminds us, that

The contents of this communique were such as to be taken by most readers, including—what was most important—the Japanese Government, as a rebuff to the United States.²⁹

The average reader would probably consider Mr. Stimson's language of 1936 as clear enough; in any case, the Secretary of State subsequently removed the possible doubt. His considered reference in *On Active Service in Peace and War* runs as follows:

The response of the British Government, so far from supporting his position was a plain rebuff. . . . What the British would not do the French would not do, nor the Dutch nor the Italians. The American Government stood alone. It seems a fair conjecture that this new form of splendid isolation was partly responsible for the cool cheek of the Japanese reply on January 16, which firmly reasserted Japan's intention to defend the sanctity of treaties and thanked the United States for its eagerness to "support Japan's efforts" to this end.³⁰

This "fair conjecture" that the Foreign Office communique was an encouragement to Japan need not be regarded as merely a case of wisdom after the event. The London weekly journal, *The Economist*, of January 16, 1932,³¹ made virtually the same point in its first issue after the ill-fated communique. Said *The Economist* in an editorial entitled "The American Note to Japan":

It is almost as though the Foreign Office had "tipped the wink" to the Japanese Government that Japan could do what she liked about China's integrity and independence as far as Great Britain was concerned.

From our viewpoint in 1954 there seems only one possible comment on this incident of January 9, 1932. At the best it was a lamentable lapse in diplomatic good manners. It also appears to have had a profoundly disturbing influence on Secretary Stimson, perhaps not so much at the

28. Pratt, *op. cit.*, p. 227.

29. *Far Eastern Crisis*, p. 101.

30. *Ibid.* p. 82.

31. Vol. CXIV No. 4,612, p. 104.

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time as a little later when it seems to have had the effect of colouring his emotional reactions and confusing his judgment in the next stage of the joint non-recognition proposals discussed by him with Sir John Simon.

Before passing to this third phase of the controversy it is only fair to note Sir John Pratt's comment on the communique of January 9. In his letter to the *London Times* on November 30, 1938, Sir John claimed that the Stimson Note of January 7 was not at the time regarded as "invested with the significance which, by its subsequent history, became attached to it." In point of form he freely admitted that the Foreign Office communique was "a bad blunder for which there is no real excuse."³² It is to be explained only by the fact that it was "drafted and approved in haste by the permanent officials at 1 o'clock on Saturday."³³

Perhaps the most charitable epitaph with which to bury the Foreign Office communique of January 9, 1932 is to describe it as one more example of what Europeans used to regard as that peculiarly English politico-administrative phenomenon, "the long week-end"!

VI

"Disappointed" as he confessed himself to have been³⁴ at the "rebuff" of January 9, the Secretary of State did not give up hope of securing the support of the co-signatories of the Nine Power Treaty for the non-recognition doctrine. Towards the end of Part III of his *Far Eastern Crisis* Mr. Stimson tells³⁵ how a month later he "invited in" the British Ambassador and told him that he was impressed with the importance "at the present juncture" of invoking the Nine Power Treaty. His account of what followed is worth quoting at some length.

Time was pressing; the Japanese were evidently preparing for a new and more powerful attack on Shanghai. On February 11th the President suggested that I call up the British Foreign Minister, Sir John Simon, directly on the telephone in order to hasten the matter and to have the best possible opportunity for fully discussing the proposition and ascertaining whether the British government would co-operate. I did so the same day. He was in Geneva at a meeting of the Council of the League of Nations . . . I explained to him fully and at length the main reasons which actuated me in desiring to make such a *demarche* under the Nine Power Treaty . . . I suggested that our two governments together with any other signatories who might be willing to follow us, might act under Article VII of that treaty in a joint statement as to the attack thus made on the policy of the Nine Power Treaty, and make it clear that we, as such signatories, did not propose to acquiesce in any of the suggestions for the abandonment of that treaty which were

32. *War and Politics in China*, p. 227.

33. *Ibid.*, p. 276.

34. *Far Eastern Crisis*, p. 100.

35. Pp. 162 et seq.

emanating from Tokyo. The following day, February 12th, I talked with him again at Geneva after he had had an opportunity to reflect upon the suggestion, and on that day, at his request, I cabled him a proposed draft of such a joint statement, which I had prepared with my assistants in the Department. I made it clear to him that this statement was, in form, merely a tentative draft open for the fullest discussion and amendment . . .

I talked with the Foreign Minister again on the same subject at London on February 13th and February 15th and, while no explicit refusal to my suggestion was ever made, I finally became convinced from his attitude in those conversations that for reasons satisfactory to it, and which I certainly had no desire to inquire into or criticize, the British government felt reluctant to join in such a *démarche*. I therefore pressed it no further.

The British nonjoinder obviously killed the possibility of any such *démarche*.

"Deeply discouraged" for some days and apparently "doomed to inaction while a great tragedy was following its predestined course,"³⁶ the Secretary of State then hit upon the device of a unilateral American declaration in the form of a public letter to the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate—the much-publicised letter of February 23, 1932 to Senator Borah.

The Simon-Stimson myth has flourished greatly on this alleged additional evidence of British refusal to co-operate in mid-February, 1932. During the next few years both American and British critics denounced Sir John Simon for his failure to support Mr. Stimson. In Great Britain many of the critics were on the Left, but they included others such as the Earl of Lytton and the Marquess of Lothian. The former declared at the University of Manchester on May 17, 1934 that

The United States have made overtures which have not been reciprocated; and the failure of our Government to back up Mr. Stimson is perhaps the most regrettable of all its shortcomings.³⁷

Lord Lothian, speaking at Chatham House later in the same year, carried the argument further.

I have always thought that the mistake of British policy at that time was not the view it took of Japan's intentions in Manchuria—I think its diagnosis was closer to the realities than that of the United States — but its rejection of Mr. Stimson's offer to reverse the isolationist decision of 1920 and to act with us in support of the collective system in the Pacific. This failure on our part to live up to the spirit and the letter of the Washington Treaties early in 1932 drove the United States back into isolation.³⁸

36. *Far Eastern Crisis*, p. 165.

37. Bassett, *op. cit.*, p. 131.

38. *International Affairs*, Vol. XIV, No. 2, March-April 1935, p. 166.

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In the light of evidence now available, it seems clear that these and similar criticisms were not fully warranted by the facts. In so far as the criticisms imply that Sir John Simon rejected or pushed aside Mr. Stimson's telephoned request for critical consideration and support for the "tentative draft" cabled to London after the second of the four transatlantic telephone messages on February 12, they have been denied categorically by Sir John Pratt. Far from declining to consider or to support the cabled draft, the Foreign Secretary actually handed a written reply to the Counsellor of the American Embassy in London on February 16. As the story now appears in Sir John Pratt's *War and Politics in China*³⁹, this reply not only gave the British Government's criticisms and suggestions as requested, it also added:

Sir John Simon has already told Mr. Stimson how keenly the British Government wishes to keep in close co-operation with America over the whole field of the Far Eastern crisis, and he is hopeful that the adherence of the Powers now at Geneva to the declaration proposed to be made by the Council of the League on Wednesday might predispose those of them who are signatories of the Nine Power Treaty to associate themselves with the American *démarche* also.

What is more, "the Powers now at Geneva" did adhere to the declaration. In an earlier letter to the *London Times* on November 10, 1938,⁴⁰ subsequently confirmed by Sir John Simon in the House of Commons, Pratt told how, after the Foreign Secretary had considered Mr. Stimson's cabled draft, the Foreign Office had telephoned Geneva a paragraph containing the non-recognition doctrine which was taken from the draft. This paragraph, at Sir John Simon's request, was included in the Note to Japan⁴¹ sent by the twelve members of the League Council on February 16—a week before Stimson in despair abandoned co-operation with other governments in favour of the letter to Senator Borah.

Bassett in his *Democracy and Foreign Policy* is thus convincing when he defends Sir John Simon at this point.

Over a week before the Stimson-Borah letter was published, it must be reiterated, the twelve members of the League Council had expressed their support of the non-recognition policy, on the suggestion of the British Government. A fortnight after the Letter, the British Government again took the lead.

At the Assembly of the League of Nations on March 11th, 1932, a Resolution was passed unanimously (China and Japan not voting). The first part of this Resolution, after reciting the non-recognition declaration in the Note to Japan of the twelve Council

39. P. 228.

40. *Ibid.* pp. 271-4.

41. For text see W. W. Willoughby, *op. cit.*, pp. 239-40.

members on February 16th, and recalling the terms of the Pact of Paris, declared

that it is incumbent upon the members of the League of Nations not to recognise any situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought about by means, contrary to the Covenant of the League of Nations or to the Pact of Paris.

The Resolution was proposed by Sir John Simon. It was, in large measure, drafted by him. To him, in particular, was due the inclusion of the reference to the Pact of Paris. The wording, with necessary adaptation, was taken directly from the American Note of January 7.⁴²

How are we to explain Mr. Stimson's decision to abandon his efforts to obtain a joint declaration of non-recognition? This question carries the historian beyond the point of demonstrable fact into the realm of conjecture. Explanation probably lies as much in the personalities of the two men and the impressions they made upon one another as in the recorded evidence of what the Secretary of State specifically requested and what the Foreign Secretary actually did. For restrained statement of this viewpoint the 1940 British Library of Information Memorandum may be quoted.

It would seem that Mr. Stimson must have felt that the tone of the telephone conversations which he had with Sir John Simon on this subject were such as to nullify the message from the Foreign Office referred to above. As no record of these conversations has been published it is, of course, impossible to judge. As to the absence of a record of the telephone conversations, the American transcripts are now available in *Foreign Relations of the United States 1932*, Vol. III (*supra*, p. 10) but they are not an accepted copy; they are incomplete and they cannot, of course, convey the "tone" of the conversations. In any case no one would contend that these telephone conversations stood alone as representing the Government's view. The Foreign Office message was, after all, the official statement of policy, and it does not appear to justify the assertion that the British Government was not prepared "to go along with America."⁴³

So much for the third of the three phases I have selected in the story of the proposed collaboration between the United States, on the one hand, and the Powers who were signatories of both League Covenant and Nine Power Treaty on the other. Insofar as blame may be apportioned between United States and Great Britain for the failure of effective col-

42. Bassett, *op. cit.*, p. 109.

43. Cf Sir John Pratt's considered comment (*War and Politics in China*, p. 226): "The one serious error which the Foreign Office made in 1931-32 was its failure to gain the confidence and goodwill of Mr. Stimson. However little substance there may be in the complaints he makes against us in his book, *The Far Eastern Crisis*, the fact remains that it was one of the main objects of our policy to keep in step and maintain close and friendly relations with America, and somehow we failed."

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laboration in restraint of Japan in respect of these three incidents from September, 1931 to February/March, 1932, it rests clearly with Stimson in September, 1931 and with the Foreign Office on January 9, 1932. As to the events of February, the most charitable course might be to fall back upon the Scottish verdict of Not Proven — for the recorded evidence acquits Simon while the imponderable factors suggest that Stimson may well have entertained a genuine doubt as to British intentions in February — genuine doubt based on his impressions of four telephone talks and on the legacy of the Foreign Office communique of January 9 plus the *Times* editorial of January 11.

VII

It is tempting to let the controversy rest at this point. Unfortunately, the Simon-Stimson myth has swollen beyond the particular incidents in question. In its popular form it goes much further and attributes to the United States a readiness to proceed beyond words to deeds in restraint of Japan in 1932. The implication is that the United States under Mr. Stimson's leadership was prepared, if necessary, to take part in sanctions against Japan — economic sanctions in the first instance but naval action also, perhaps, if economic sanctions proved abortive. Failure to take advantage of this is laid at the door of the Conservative Government in London. On Sir John Simon's advice the British Government is alleged to have refused the American offer of collective sanctions against Japan. The refusal is explained by some critics as due to Sir John Simon's lack of imagination in international affairs. As Professor Arnold Toynbee put it in 1933, Sir John based his attitude on a diplomacy which was "essentially negative and unconstructive."⁴⁴ It was also alleged that the British Government was unduly worried because its Service chiefs feared that a harassed Japan's "immediate reply would be to attack our naval bases at Hong Kong and even Singapore."⁴⁵

It has been difficult to dispel this manifestation of the Simon-Stimson myth because at first sight it, too, has a certain basis in fact. The British Government was indeed deeply concerned at its strategic weakness in the Far East. It is also at least arguable that Sir John Simon lacked the broad sympathy with the League system of either his predecessor, Sir Austen Chamberlain, or his successor, Mr. Anthony Eden. Moreover, it is true that Mr. Stimson at one stage of the dispute was eager to link the United States with economic sanctions against Japan. The evidence available to-day, however, makes it possible to say without hesitation that *at no time during the Manchurian dispute was President Hoover's Government prepared to contemplate the use of economic sanctions by the United States against Japan.* This seemed clear enough 14 years

44. *Survey of International Affairs 1932*, pp. 529-30.

45. Major General A. C. Temperley, *The Whispering Gallery of Europe* (London, 1938), p. 321. See also: Toynbee, *op. cit.*, pp. 525-29, and Pratt, *op. cit.*, pp. 221-2.

ago after the published statements on the Hoover policies referred to in the bibliographical survey above. Now that we have the 1954 results of Dr. Current's researches and, in particular, his fully documented article on "The Stimson Doctrine and the Hoover Doctrine" in the April, 1954 issue of *The American Historical Review* the evidence is final and conclusive.

The essential facts may be summarised as follows:

First, it must be admitted that the possibility of applying collective economic sanctions against Japan was considered by Mr. Stimson in 1931. As the Secretary of State wrote in his *Far Eastern Crisis in 1936*, economic sanctions were among the forms of "possible action" which were "discussed by us at the State Department during the autumn weeks"⁴⁶ of 1931.

Second, it is equally clear that, during this period, Stimson recognised that U.S. commitment to economic sanctions was quite impossible. Continuing his 1936 account he wrote, "Our Congress was not in session and there was no statutory authority under which the Executive could impose economic sanctions. Furthermore, it was quite unlikely that any such authority would be granted by the Congress."⁴⁷ This is confirmed by Dr. Current's contemporary evidence. As late as November 7, 1931, Stimson had written in his diary that he concurred with President Hoover about "the danger of a blockade leading to war."⁴⁸ In another part of the *Far Eastern Crisis*⁴⁹ he admitted that "without the United States the League's use of sanctions would have been incomplete and comparatively ineffective" since the United States possessed one third of the world's trade with Japan. He therefore repeated his earlier statement that "during those early months" the League could not have had "American co-operation in the use of sanctions."

These two points may be made with confidence. Economic sanctions were considered, but rejected, at Washington in 1931. The third question arises whether at later stages, during 1932 or 1933, Britain and the League Powers could have had "American co-operation in the use of sanctions," as Stimson put it, if those Powers had been prepared to impose them against Japan.

It is at this point that Dr. Current's researches are particularly valuable. His article in *The American Historical Review* makes clear that, whereas during the early months of the dispute the Secretary of State had seen eye to eye with the President and with his Under-Secretary Castle, in December, 1931 he began to fluctuate "between the President's position and that of the 'many people' who, he said, were 'getting impatient and urging drastic steps or words upon him!'"⁵⁰ Both Under-Secretary of State Castle and President Hoover were still strongly opposed

46. P. 56.

47. Ibid. p. 76.

48. Current, loc. cit., p. 520.

49. P. 83.

50. Current, loc. cit., p. 521.

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to economic sanctions and Stimson appears to have accepted the non-recognition plan in January/February as a sort of half-way house.

At the end of January, when the Japanese moved against the Chinese in and around Shanghai to break up the Chinese boycott against Japan, the difference between Secretary of State and President became more acute. Hoover was ready to send "a strong contingent of American troops and naval forces" to Shanghai "to protect the lives of Americans"⁵¹ but Stimson was prepared to go further. He wished to use U.S. naval forces "to bluff and threaten Japan."⁵² At this stage, as Dr. Current remarks, the Secretary of State was thinking less of economic sanctions than of naval power. In mid February he wrote in his diary: "the only force I have got to depend upon to-day is the American Navy."⁵³

By the end of February Stimson seems to have been swinging towards economic sanctions and the hope that he might bring Hoover round to his way of thinking. In this he failed. Hoover even wanted a sentence inserted in the Borah letter of February 23 indicating that the only sanction in the mind of the United States Government was world opinion. Stimson persuaded the President to omit this to as "to leave the Japanese guessing on that point still."⁵⁴

Dr. Current is satisfied that, by the time of his letter to Senator Borah on February 23, 1932, Stimson had much more in mind than merely non-recognition.

He was now looking forward to the eventual use of economic sanctions. And he was also looking, more immediately, toward the use, or at least the threat, of American naval power . . . To him, though not to Hoover, the publication of the letter (to Borah) as well as the naval display at Shanghai, was a far-seeing move in a game of diplomatic bluff and power politics.⁵⁵

By March 9 Stimson wrote in his diary that there was "shaping up" an issue between "the two great theories of civilisation." It was "almost impossible," he wrote, "that there should not be an armed clash between two such different civilisations."⁵⁶ At a Cabinet meeting on April 5 he warned President Hoover that he had better "keep his powder dry."⁵⁷

The evidence cited should be sufficient to reveal that there was indeed considerable foundation in fact for the view that Secretary of State Stimson was moving towards economic sanctions (and perhaps something more) in restraint of Japan. The fourth point to make in this summary nevertheless must be that Dr. Current's work confirms the evidence previously available that President Hoover, with whom

51. *Memoirs of Herbert Hoover*, II, p. 374.

52. Current, loc. cit., p. 527.

53. P. 528.

54. *Castle Diary*, February 23; *Stimson Diary*, February 24-quoted Current, loc. cit., p. 530.

55. Current, loc. cit., p. 531.

56. Cf. p. 532.

57. *Stimson Diary*, April 5, cited Current, loc. cit., p. 532.

decision rested, was irrevocably opposed to any sanction against Japan other than that of moral suasion.

Taking advantage of Stimson's absence in Europe in April-May, 1932, Hoover used Castle as Acting Secretary of State to make two speeches in which the Acting Secretary of State "assured the American people that their government's policy excluded sanctions of economic pressure or military force."⁵⁸ When Stimson protested on his return to Washington Hoover took full responsibility.

In short, the policy of the President, a sincere Quaker, remained as he had formulated it before his Cabinet "shortly after the middle of October," 1931, and as he reproduced it in the second volume of his *Memoirs* in 1952.⁵⁹

. . . We have a moral obligation to use every influence short of war to have the treaties upheld or terminated by mutual agreement. We should co-operate with the rest of the world, we should do so as long as that co-operation remains in the fields of moral pressures. As the League of Nations has already taken up the subject we should co-operate with them in every field of negotiation or concentration. But that is the limit. We will not go along on war or any of the sanctions, either economic or military, for those are the roads to war.

For those who like to speculate on the might-have-beens of history is a nice point whether Stimson's views on economic and other sanctions might have been carried further if he had been Secretary of State to Franklin Roosevelt instead of to Herbert Hoover. There is, indeed, evidence to suggest a closer relationship between the retiring Secretary and the President-elect during the four months following Hoover's defeat by Roosevelt in the November, 1932 Presidential elections and the latter's inauguration in the following March.⁶⁰

The hard fact nevertheless remains that insofar as Mr. Stimson was moving towards economic or military sanctions during his several negotiations with Sir John Simon he was without authority to do so, and the British Foreign Secretary knew it. In American language, Mr. Stimson was "out on a limb" in this matter. Sir John Simon had no reason whatever for believing that he would be able to rely on American deeds, as distinct from American words, if British or League action against Japan brought retaliation against British interests in the Far East — retaliation which British Service chiefs apparently considered the limited and dispersed naval forces of the British Government would have been insufficient to repel.

VIII

It is not within the province of this paper to pronounce final judgment

58. *Current, loc. cit.*, p. 534.

59. Pp. 368-70. It had previously been published by Secretaries Wilbur and Hyde in 1937. See also Sara Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 149-150.

60. *Current, loc. cit.*, pp. 535-542; Stimson, *On Active Service in Peace and War*, pp. 119-125.

on the several decisions arrived at either by Mr. Stimson or by Sir John Simon. This may be left to historians further removed from the events. A *caveat* may, however, be entered now against any judgment being given without argument having first been heard on the following points.

In Stimson's case, the historian of the future should first consider the background of American isolationism, both traditional and as it emerged from the domestic party politics of the early 'twenties. Despite the Kellogg Peace Pact of 1928 there was still extreme sensitivity in many quarters in the United States in 1931 on any form of direct association with British and European Governments in League affairs. Stimson's uneasiness on even temporary representation of the United States at League Council meetings is a good example. This was most apparent in October-November, 1931.⁶¹

It is also worth recalling that, even in respect to the Far East, in which region Americans had long been less sensitive of involvement than in the affairs of Europe, April of the year 1932 was to see the passage through the House of Representatives of the Bill for the independence of the Philippines, despite White House opposition.

Indeed, when one considers the Secretary of State's domestic political environment: A Quaker President; an American Congress and public traditionally suspicious of international entanglements; powerful economic and liberal opposition to continued commitments in the Philippines; and, to cap all, a Presidential election campaign looming in November, 1932—against this background, Mr. Stimson's personal recognition of the gravity of the international situation and his earnest and persistent groping for a solution which would be conducive to world peace and consistent with political realities in America cannot fail to command admiration. It does not imply approval of the Secretary of State's judgment at every point to predict that he will emerge from future historians' tests with increased respect.

Henry Stimson had neither the intellectual penetration of Woodrow Wilson nor the political genius of Franklin Roosevelt. All three men nevertheless had high moral courage and a strong sense of social service. The opinion may therefore be ventured that the verdict of history will accord Stimson an honoured place with both Wilson and Roosevelt among those responsible for directing the enormous resources of the American nation, idealist and emotional as well as economic, towards its rightful responsibilities in world leadership.

The difficulties in pronouncing judgment on Sir John Simon's several decisions in 1932 are much greater. It must suffice here merely to sketch in the setting against which the British Foreign Secretary worked at the close of what Arnold Toynbee very aptly called *annus terribilis*, the year 1931.

61. E.g. Current, loc. cit., p. 518.

The British Government was faced by the results of the 1922 Washington agreements which had left it with limited naval resources and a strategically weakened position in the western Pacific. By August/September 1931 the world-wide economic depression had also confronted it with staggering decisions. The relevance of these to the present discussion may perhaps be pinpointed by a reminder that on the same day in September, 1931, the New York newspapers carried two headlines. One was: "China Appeals to the League"; the other read: "Britain Leaves the Gold Standard."

Across the North Sea, moreover, disturbing trends in Germany were already giving cause for grave concern in Whitehall. Reviving fears as to the future in Germany made the British Foreign Office even more reluctant to contemplate unilateral commitments across the Pacific. Nor could the Foreign Office ignore the fact that such commitments would range Great Britain alongside a divided China whose National Government's writ did not run in at least some of the contentious areas. Australian critics of Sir John Simon would also do well to remember the attitude of outlying Dominions on the Manchurian and related questions.

To the present writer it now seems that when argument on all the questions has been heard, future historians will find that the weight of the evidence is in favour of Sir John Simon on the issue as a whole. It does, however, appear that the Foreign Secretary lacked the personal characteristics which might have contributed something more to win the confidence both of the American Secretary of State and of those whose sympathetic understanding was desirable even on the Opposition benches of the House of Commons.

Without entering on the wider and deeper issues of policy, it is perhaps not unfair to say that in this regard, by his inability to inspire warm feelings of personal confidence as well as respect for intellectual ability, Sir John Simon may have contributed something to the origin of the myth so long associated with his name and that of Mr. Stimson. This is one part of Toynbee's criticism:⁶²

In playing a new role of the highest responsibility, under anxious and exacting conditions, Sir John Simon employed all the vigour and subtlety of a brilliant and practised legal mind . . . In saving the Government which he represented from being committed to any course of action which might involve it in any risk, or which, even short of that, might be resented officially as unfriendly by any other Power, Sir John Simon showed, throughout, a marvellous address, while in his most brilliant moments he emulated the virtuosity of a Talleyrand or a Metternich. At the same time . . . the ends which were actually secured by Sir John Simon's diplomacy

62. *Survey of International Affairs 1932*, pp. 529-30.

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(on the concordant testimony of British and foreign observers alike) were a disquieting uncertainty in regard to British objectives, and a corresponding mistrust of British intentions, in the minds of Sir John Simon's foreign colleagues at Washington and at Geneva; and this diminution of confidence and goodwill was inevitably accompanied by a cooling-off of old friendships to a degree which could scarcely be recompensed by the utmost adroitness in the avoidance of new enmities.

Future historians may qualify Toynbee's biting comment made so near the event. It were better, perhaps, that this paper should conclude with another quotation, this time from a supporter of Sir John Simon,⁶³ which is more strictly relevant to the Simon-Stimson myth. The Sino-Japanese dispute over Manchuria, Sir John Pratt wrote in 1943, . . . has been the subject of more misunderstanding than any other event in recent history. This is not because material for judgment is lacking . . . The reason for the obscurity in which the episode is shrouded and the myths that have clustered around it is not lack of information—but excess of emotion.

With the additional information available since 1943 it should not be difficult to discipline emotional reactions and so lay the ghost which still walks when men talk on public platforms of the events of 1931-32. A survey such as that made in this paper may perhaps also serve another useful purpose if it succeeds in convincing us of the ease with which imperfect information and strong feeling may combine to produce rash judgments and harmful legends.

The warning is the more appropriate to-day when some American publicists seem busily engaged trying to cover up the failure of United States policy in respect to Indo-China by spreading reports of British duplicity and non-co-operation in joint military action before Dien Bien Phu, to check another round of "aggression" further south across the western Pacific.⁶⁴ Australians, to whose prosperity and security the closest of Anglo-American co-operation is of vital importance, may at least hope that a new Eden-Dulles myth will not shortly arise from the troubled grave of the Simon-Stimson controversies.

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October, 1954.

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63. Pratt, *op. cit.*, p. 208.

64. E.g. U.S. News and World Report, 18th June, 1954, p. 35—"Did Britain reverse its stand on 'collective defence' after promising to go along? Yes."

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The Colombo Plan Passes Halfway

C. W. James

- I. The Volume of Aid.*
- II. The Magnitude of Asian Needs.*
- III. Aid in Relation to Needs.*
- IV. The Composition of Foreign Aid.*
- V. Enlarged Membership.*
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 - (iii) The Role of Enterprise.*
- VII. Prospect.*

The Colombo Plan has entered its most interesting and, at the same time, its most critical phase. It has never been so well and widely known. In its more than three years of operations, it has won many supporters in non-communist countries. Recent developments in Asia have attracted renewed and intensified public attention to the Plan. The SEATO proposals and even the recent admission of Japan threaten—or promise—to extend its significance and also, perhaps, to change its character.

Originally, the Colombo Plan was scheduled to occupy six years—until the 30th June, 1957. Now therefore it has run just over half its scheduled course. Especially in the light of recent events in Asia, few would now guarantee that the original term will not be exceeded, although any decision to extend the Plan will probably not be taken until the original term has more nearly expired.

I. The Volume Of Aid.

By any standards, aid extended under the Colombo Plan's Economic Development Programme has already been huge. Some of it—that part consisting of sterling releases by the United Kingdom—has consisted of resources already belonging but dubiously available to Asian countries. But most of the aid has been entirely new and, in the space of the past three years, has built up a co-operative association between Asian and Western countries that would otherwise have been difficult to achieve.

The Colombo Plan really comprises two closely related, and inter-dependent programmes—the Economic Development Programme and the Technical Co-operation Scheme. The latter tends to be the best known, largely because of the personal contacts it achieves through bringing

large numbers of Asian students to Australia and dispatching lesser numbers of Australian experts to Asia. But the Economic Development Programme is much vaster in scope, involves huge expenditures, and calls for co-ordination of a host of projects in each Asian country. It is the programme by which the Colombo Plan will ultimately be evaluated; and this article will therefore not deal, except in passing, with the companion Technical Co-operation Scheme.

Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States have all pledged contributions to the Colombo Plan programmes on an annual, three-year, or six-year basis. These contributions—the great bulk of which will go to the Economic Development Programme—may be tabulated according to annual rate or six-year total, as follows:

	Average Annual Rate £ A m.	Pledged or Prospective Six-Year Total £ A m.
Australia	5.8	34.75
Canada	12	72
New Zealand	1.3	8
United Kingdom	14*	84*
United States	73	438
<hr/> Total	<hr/> 106.1	<hr/> 636.75

* Excludes sterling releases and Asian government loan raisings on the London market which, in 1953-54, were £A6.25 million.

No large postwar aid programme has, of course, been possible without United States participation and, since the Colombo Plan was formulated, that country has made its customarily generous contribution to Asian needs. The originators of the Plan always hoped that the United States would join them, and her full participation, with the outstanding record of aid so far given, has greatly enhanced the Plan's prospects of success.

To aid from individual governments has to be added grant aid and loan assistance from United Nations programmes and agencies, and from some private foundations. Especially in the case of loans from the World Bank and—to a lesser extent—aid provided under the United Nations Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance, the supplement from international organisations has been considerable.

In 1953-54, total grant aid and loan assistance from all overseas sources was in the vicinity of \$ U.S. 300 million, or about £A135 million. If this were taken as a fair annual average figure—and it probably is—then we could say that Colombo Plan recipient countries have absorbed, in grant aid and loans, about £A 300 million in the first half of the Colombo Plan, and should have received about £A 600 million when the Plan's full six-year term ends in 1957. Although

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this is a huge sum of money, it can be put into proper perspective only by relating it to the assessed needs of Asian countries. What is the estimated total of these needs?

2. *Magnitude Of Asian Needs.*

Any estimate of Asian needs—whether for external finance or for mobilisation of domestic capital—must make some assumptions about standards of life, distribution of income, level of international trade, and so on. Any attempt to give Asia's millions a standard of life comparable with that in, say, North America would be futile. Similarly, any attempt to make Asia completely independent of imported capital goods within a short period would be ill-advised and would face certain failure. Even an effort to make Asia completely independent of outside food supplies would not be easy.

Nevertheless, it is clear that, no matter how modestly the sights are set, the target will be hard to hit. Asian populations are increasing at a high rate each year. National income must increase at a correspondingly high rate merely to maintain current living standards. This must surely be the minimum target—to hold the present line. But even at this minimum, the need for new capital is huge and dwarfs the figures for aid already given.

This minimum—or little beyond it—is the target which Asian countries have in fact set themselves under the Colombo Plan. The London Report of the Consultative Committee,¹ published in October, 1950, said:

In terms of the standard of living of the people, the growth of productive power is not likely to show spectacular results by 1957 . . . The programmes will do little more than hold the present position, but it will be apparent to everyone in South and South-East Asia that progress is being made. The strength of these programmes is that they are designed to lay sound foundations for further development: they aim to provide, in a six-year period, the indispensable preliminary basic development which will pave the way for improvement in the future.²

Broadly, this still describes the humble goal of Asian Governments' development programmes. But cost increases, together with some real revisions of the programmes, have greatly inflated the original estimates of finance required. Table 2 shows the extent of this inflation.

1. The Consultative Committee consists of representatives of both Asian and Western governments participating in the Colombo Plan and meets, usually at Ministerial level, each year. Each Asian Government submits its development programme to the annual Consultative Committee meeting and these are brought together in an annual report which includes too details of aid contributed from outside the area—and indeed among Asian countries themselves. The Consultative Committee, as its title implies, has no policy or executive authority but enables countries to discuss Asian development freely on a fruitfully co-operative basis. Cmd. 8080, p. 44.
- 2.

Table 2: Estimated Finance Required for Public Development Programmes of Commonwealth Asian Countries.

	Estimate Oct. '50	Estimate Mar. '52	Estimate Oct. '53	Estimate Oct. '54
	£ A	£ A	£ A	£ A
India	1,724	2,189	2,479	2,639
Pakistan	350	470*	532†	739‡
Ceylon	127	300	340†	199‡
British SEA Territories	134	180*	204†	215‡
Total	2,335	3,139	3,555	3,792

* Based on increase in Indian and Pakistani programmes.

† Based on increase in Indian programme.

‡ First four years programme, plus last two years at fourth year's rate. The apparent drastic reduction in Ceylon's programme seems due to changed definition of development expenditure.

In four years therefore, planned expenditure has increased by about £A1,457 million, or by about 62 p.c. This occurred in a period when the prices of internationally traded goods rose steeply because of the Korean War and Western rearmament. Prices for Asian imports have recently levelled off or even fallen; but Asian export prices fell, in most cases, much sooner and much further and, although they have now more or less stabilised, development programmes have, in the meantime, become much more difficult to finance. Among the brighter aspects however, we may note firstly that the International Tin Agreement should add a further element of stability to Asian export proceeds, and, secondly, that the prospects are now better than for some time that development costs generally will remain fairly steady.

3. Aid In Relation To Needs.

Table 2 shows that Commonwealth Asian Governments now need about £A3,792 million to finance their total programmes; and the needs of non-Commonwealth countries must be added to this figure. Earlier, the prospective six-year total of international aid was tallied at about £A 600 million. Clearly, therefore, Asian countries must themselves bear most of the development burden and the Colombo Plan must properly be regarded as essentially a plan of self-help, with only the margin of needs being supplied from overseas.

Nevertheless, the margin of aid, in relation to total development expenditure, has so far been sufficiently large to establish conclusively the sincerity of Western efforts to help South and South-East Asia. Rather than take the whole six-year period, it is better and fairer to assess the margin of overseas aid by reference to the actual experience in a single year.

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The Ottawa Report of the Consultative Committee (October, 1954) shows that the cost of development in the public sector in 1953-54 for Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia, Malaya, British Borneo, and Pakistan, was £A680 million. In the same financial year, external grant aid and loan assistance to these countries, from Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the World Bank amounted to £A125 million. In other words, external aid represented more than 18 p.c. of public development expenditure in 1953-54.

Certain qualifications should be made to this. For example, a World Bank loan granted in 1953-54 is not necessarily spent—or is seldom *all* spent—within that financial year. Similarly, loans made available by the United States through its Export-Import Bank are rarely spent wholly within the year in which they are granted. On the other hand, it cannot be alleged that loans granted in 1953-54 were exceptional in amount, and it may be that the rate of lending will be maintained—or even increased—in future years.

At least, it seems possible to conclude that international grant aid and loan assistance to South and South-East Asian countries is at present running at a rate sufficient to meet something over 15 p.c. of public development expenditure. Although this will not alter the “self-help” character of the Colombo Plan, it will provide that critical margin of Asian needs without which development objectives will not be attained.

4. *The Composition Of Foreign Aid.*

International aid is conveniently measured in financial terms. But it seldom takes the form of actual cash grants. Instead it is usually converted by the donor into real goods and services, and thus reaches Asian countries in a form in which it can readily be assimilated into current development projects.

Few restrictions³ have been placed on the kinds of goods and services which may be sent to Asian countries as aid under the Colombo Plan. Asian development programmes cover virtually the whole field of economic activity—agriculture, transport and communications, health, education, power, social services, industrial development, and so on. Asian Governments are free to request any equipment within the wide range of their development programmes, and they have given this freedom full play in submitting requests to Australia.

Since Australian aid is quite typical, it may be taken to illustrate the composition of Colombo Plan aid generally.

Originally, Australian aid was sent only to India, Pakistan, and Ceylon. This was because non-Commonwealth Asian countries joined the Plan later, and the United Kingdom accepted responsibility for development in its own South-East Asian territories. But as other countries joined the

3. The only important restriction is that defence material will not be supplied. Consequently, Asian Governments limit their requests strictly to civil needs.

Plan, Australian interest and actual or prospective aid was extended to them, so that the Australian aid programme assumed a wide focus on South and South-East Asia generally, rather than on any special country or group of countries within that area. The one obvious qualification was that communist countries were not intended to benefit.

Quite a large proportion of Australian aid has taken the form of consumer goods, especially wheat and flour. In so far as this aid releases foreign exchange for capital goods, it can be as directly useful for economic development as provision of capital goods directly by Australia. Proceeds of domestic sale of consumer goods also provide Asian Governments with resources to meet local development costs, so that dual—balance-of-payments and budgetary—benefits may be realised. Benefits of both kinds are conferred too by provision of Australian capital equipment for use directly on Asian development projects, and this is the form that most Australian aid has taken.

Tractors—several hundreds of them—and associated agricultural equipment, irrigation equipment, communications and broadcasting equipment, pipe-making plant, diesel locomotives, trucks, power-transmission equipment, and many other items have been supplied by Australia in response to requests received. The broad components of Australian aid, at 30th September, 1954, were as follows:

Equipment provided in the Field of—	Value £A 000's	Percentage of Total Aid %
Agriculture	9,670	54
Transport and Communications ..	4,905	28
Fuel and Power	575	3
Social Capital	2,650	15
Total	17,800	100

This composition of Australian aid is determined principally by Asian countries themselves. Asian Governments decide their own requests. Donor governments have the right to accept or reject these requests, within the context that their aim is to meet whatever requests they reasonably can. In all matters, Asian Governments do their own planning,⁴ they have full freedom and independence, and they accept responsibility for their programmes' success or failure. The general progress of Asian development comes under annual scrutiny by the Colombo Plan Consultative Committee, but the Committee has no rights of authoritative supervision or of programme modification.

5. Enlarged Membership

A feature of the past three years has been the way in which Colombo

4. If Asian Governments asked for help in planning their economic development, this could of course be provided within the framework of the Colombo Plan.

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Plan membership has been enlarged. Originally, the Plan had a wholly Commonwealth membership and had only three independent Asian participants—India, Pakistan, and Ceylon—plus the British Territories in South-East Asia. Burma and the Indo-Chinese States of Cambodia, Vietnam, and Laos joined fairly quickly; Indonesia came in a little later; and, in the past few months, Thailand, the Philippines, and Japan have all been admitted to membership. All countries within the Colombo Plan area are now members. This completion of Asian membership may be taken as Asian approval of the British Commonwealth initiative shown at Colombo in January, 1950, and as a vote of confidence too, in the way in which that initiative has since been developed.

United States participation has been the other most important feature of enlarged membership. The United States is an active member of the Colombo Plan Consultative Committee and regularly contributes to the Committee's annual report. Note has already been made of the size and significance of the funds that the United States has allotted to Asian development programmes.

6. *Some Special Problems*

Colombo Plan programmes obviously involve a host of problems both of principle and of detail. Some of them have been touched on already. Others—for example, detailed procedures for meeting requests—are seemingly trivial but could cause unnecessary frustrations and delays if left unsolved. Although it is not possible to deal with all these problems, three seemingly major issues are dealt with in what follows. They are: (i) Financing the Programme; (ii) The Terms of Trade; and (iii) The Role of Enterprise.

(i). *Financing the Programme.* Since the Colombo Plan is based firmly on the principle of self-help, the Plan's success clearly must depend on the wisdom with which Asian Governments seek and apply available finance within their own frontiers. The ways open to Asian Governments to finance their development programmes are much the same as those available to Western treasurers; but the extent to which these means may be applied and their impact on the economy might be a good deal different in Asia and might vary greatly even among Asian countries themselves.

Development programmes may be financed in three principal ways: by taxation, by public borrowing, and by central bank credit. All three means have been used by Asian Governments and the problem is to keep each in step with the others and to develop a balanced financial approach which puts the economy under least strain. Deficit financing, involving the use of central bank credit, must be a source of constant temptation to Asian treasurers—as indeed it is to many treasurers elsewhere—and it is something there-

fore about which Asian Governments have to be especially watchful and have to exercise especial restraint.

The financial methods appropriate to underdeveloped countries have been considered on a number of occasions by United Nations and associated bodies. The Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East has, for example, conducted studies over a period of years into mobilisation of domestic capital in Asia. Within the Colombo Plan framework, the Consultative Committee has, through its reports, thrown light on the domestic financial arrangements being made by its Asian members for economic development.

The Ottawa Report shows that India, for example, spent about Rs.9,166 million on her development programme in the three years from 1951-52 to 1953-54. Of this, Rs. 5,716 million came from surpluses of the Central and State Governments, rupee loans, "small savings," and other miscellaneous receipts. A further Rs. 1,314 million came from external loans and grants. But a gap of Rs. 2,136 million remained to be met from cash balances, investment reserves, and increases in the floating debt. The Report continues as follows:

Efforts have been made during the first three years of the Plan to augment resources by adopting additional measures of taxation and by increased borrowings. Thus, some of the State Governments have enhanced irrigation rates, sales tax and stamp duties. The improvement in Government borrowings has been an important source of securing financial resources for the Plan. During the last two years, Government securities have received encouraging support in the capital market. Not only have the State Governments been able to raise substantial amounts by way of new loans, but securities amounting to about Rs. 220 million held by the Centre and State Governments in their investment reserves have also been absorbed by the public. Receipts of small savings during the first three years of the Plan have brought in about Rs. 1,145 million . . .⁵

Although there are many differences in detail, and although the various Asian Governments approach them differently, the nature of Asian financial problems is essentially the same throughout the Colombo Plan area. The Ottawa Report includes this comment among its general conclusions:

The financial problems of the Colombo Plan countries, relative to their development needs, are most serious; and while progress can be recorded in many particular respects, (e.g. the growing success of India in raising loan funds from the capital market, the success of Pakistan in mobilising savings partly created by the severe restraints on importation, and the inauguration in several countries of new institutions to mobilise domestic savings and channel them into investment), on balance it appears that the gap between the estimated costs of firm development programmes and foreseeable available financial resources is widening rather than narrowing. Tax revenues have not increased proportionately to the increasing expenditure requirements dictated by the planned phasing of development outlays. The general decline of export prices has lowered the yield of export duties, and the reduction in many countries of general and particularly of 'luxury' imports has similarly lowered the yield of import duties. In view of the historic importance of such revenue sources for the countries of the area, and of the lack of any visible

5. Chapter V, para. 23.

prospect for an early rise in the general level of export prices, the Colombo Plan countries have recognised the need to find or to expand other revenue sources, but the basic problem of increasing the total tax revenues still remains.⁶

And, finally, on the seductive alternative of deficit financing, the Report counsels caution, in measured terms, as follows:

"... To meet the massive sums of capital required to finance large scale and long term projects, recourse to some form of deficit financing may sometimes appear necessary. The countries of the area have painstakingly and patiently explored within themselves, in consultation with foreign experts and international agencies, and with each other in the deliberations of the Consultative Committee, the extent to which and the circumstances in which recourse can safely be had to such financial techniques. They have concluded that the limits of safe procedure are determined by many sets of circumstances... the dangers of inflationary consequences, if domestic output does not expand sufficiently rapidly or an increase in imports is not possible, must severely limit the extent to which countries will consider it prudent to attempt to finance development by credit expansion through the banking system."⁷

(ii) *The Terms of Trade.* Since the edge went off the 1950 boom, the Consultative Committee has shown continuous concern about fluctuations in Asian terms of trade — that is, the relation between Asian import and export prices.

The Korean War and Western rearmament presented windfall gains to Asian countries which are exporters primarily of raw materials. While their export prices rose, their import prices rose much more slowly. Asian countries' balances of payments were so good in 1950 and 1951 that they had no need of foreign aid. "They were able to finance their development programmes to a large extent from their own resources and at the same time to increase their external assets and internal reserves."⁸

But if their export prices rose fastest while the boom was on, they also fell fastest and furthest when the edge went off the boom. Raw materials prices were still high, but relatively less above pre-Korea levels than the more stable prices of manufactured goods. After 1951, therefore, Asian countries needed aid not merely as much as before the boom began, but more urgently.

In the midst of the price fluctuations, the tendency was for aid to remain fixed in monetary terms. No government, including Australia, showed any inclination to adjust commitments in accordance with price changes—to use, let us say, some type of "C" Series adjustment for their international aid commitments. The result was that some aid commitments were severely reduced in real terms before they could be fulfilled. The Australian commitment of £A31½ million, announced in December, 1950, fell in real value to about £A25 million in the following 12 months, if we take the Ceylon

6. Chapter XIV, para. 29.

7. Chapter XIV, para. 31.

8. Chapter I, para. 4.

import price index as a guide. Fortunately, prices have recently been much more stable but the danger of new price fluctuations remains.

No solution to this problem of stabilising raw-materials prices and achieving some constancy in the terms of trade has yet been found. Efforts to stabilise individual commodities have been only partially successful, although agreements on wheat and tin have been concluded. Unless greater stability can be achieved, or some means devised to offset instability, the risk remains that, at almost any time, the benefits from Colombo Plan and other international aid might vanish overnight through sharp falls in Asian export prices.

At least, however, the urgency of the need to deal with the problem of fluctuations in Asian terms of trade seems, for the moment, to have gone. The Ottawa Report said:

During 1953-54 there has been no striking change in world conditions, affecting the foreign trade of the area, comparable to the boom of 1950-51 and its aftermath. Some commodities, for example tea, have risen in price. Others, for example rubber, have fallen. But there has been no marked general change, either favourable or adverse, in the terms of trade of the area. In contrast to the ups and downs of the preceding years, the prices of both exports and imports have been relatively stable.⁹

(iii) *The Role of Enterprise.* Colombo Plan donor countries have so far concentrated on provision of capital and technical assistance. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to assume that, with equipment in position and some Asians trained to use it, continuous economic development will certainly follow. Such an assumption might be valid for some economies, but, with Asian economies, even where it has some validity, its validity often stops short of that rather too readily supposed; for economic enterprise and, underlying that, the stimulus to enterprise, cannot be taken for granted in South and South-East Asian countries in the same way as in countries of the Western world. Professor J. S. Duesenberry has suggested the nature of the problem in the following terms:

... the psychological and sociological problems of overcoming the impasse in backward countries are much more complicated than the arithmetic of capital formation. After all, the backward countries of to-day could have started advancing economically many years ago. The fact that they did not, while other countries did, indicates that the problem of economic development is a deeper one than that of the mechanics of capital formation...¹⁰

In the United Kingdom and countries that followed the United Kingdom pattern of economic development, the desire for economic progress was indigenous, widespread and spontaneous. Social, political, and economic factors combined to favour economic progress or were adjusted so to do relatively quickly. The spontaneous desire for profits and material welfare, for innovation in products and techniques, preceded the accumulation of capital equipment and widespread technical skills. The latter derived from the enterprise

9. Chapter I, para. 6.

10. "Some Aspects of the Theory of Economic Development," contained in *EXPLORATIONS IN ENTREPRENEURIAL HISTORY*, Vol. III, No. 2, December, 1950.

psychology that touched off the Industrial Revolution and carried it through.

The essential feature of the British pattern was that private individuals, by their own energy and initiative, carried through a revolution in production. This development is still continuing in Britain and like countries because of the long habit of enterprise that has now been formed. To quote Duesenberry again—

Full utilisation of resources can be achieved only when there is an active and continual search for opportunities to gain by transferring resources from one use to another, whether this involves the use of new techniques or not. This searching will go on only in those societies which have institutions which facilitate resource transfers and whose members have a state of mind appropriate to this kind of activity.¹¹

The Colombo Plan was not intended to substitute public for private enterprise in Asia. An important part of the Plan's aim was in fact to stimulate private effort. The London Report of the Consultative Committee contained the following passage:

... the fact that the work of basic development is for the most part undertaken by public authorities in no way lessens the importance which is attached to private investment. In general, public investment in these countries is confined to basic services and to industries of strategic importance, such as the production of munitions; the establishment of new basic industries also tends to require government finance. Both in India and Pakistan there are a number of undertakings in which government and private enterprise work in partnership. In the case of Pakistan, the Government found itself compelled to take the initiative in this way, in order to inspire public confidence in the undertakings and to attract private capital to them. It is the intention of the Government to withdraw its participation in these enterprises as soon as private capital is able to provide all the necessary funds. In the general field of industry and commerce, however, the dominant role in all the countries is played by private enterprise.

As the development programmes proceed and the national incomes and savings of the countries grow, the scope for private investment will increase. It is expected, for example, that in India private investment will rise by about 60% in the course of the six-year period. In the Federation of Malaya, where the major export industries are entirely privately owned, private investment in agriculture, mining and industry will be substantially greater than the public investment in these fields. Throughout these countries, public development paves the way for private investment.¹²

So far, the drive for economic development in Asian countries has been largely imposed from above by governments. Low living standards, under-employment, and so on are attributed to a shortage of capital and technical skills as compared with European-type economies. The desire to acquire these two things is not a response to a spontaneous Western-type spirit of enterprise, but has its roots in a number of less productive desires, including for example a simple desire for enhanced national prestige.

If governments fail to awaken sufficient enterprise in their own people, then they must fail to establish any adequate foundation for continuous economic development based on private capital. Govern-

11. *Ibid.*

12. Cmd. 8080, pp. 40-41.

ments might then themselves assume the mantle of the entrepreneurs (without the economic risk that energises and disciplines private individuals) and might thus achieve broadly the same economic purpose as private entrepreneurship. Quite apart from any economic disadvantages involved, however, a denouement of this kind might involve political risks, not only for Asian peoples themselves, but also for their neighbours.

So far the Colombo Plan has not seriously addressed itself to this set of problems. The Consultative Committee has had some discussion of a general kind, but has not attempted to set down any detailed conclusions. The Ottawa Report had only this to say, in very brief and general terms:

Noteworthy among the many problems of development is the relative weakness in these countries of private enterprise and of organisational capacity. To recognise this problem is not to solve it. As regards organisational capacity, while much can be learned by observing the experience of other countries, there is much that can be learned only by direct experience. As regards the role of private enterprise, while each government is bound to follow such policies as are suited to local conditions, governments generally speaking can help by seeking to minimize the hindrances to initiative arising from such factors as burdensome governmental regulations and irksome methods of tax administration.¹³

On the more positive and promising side, we may note the considerable exchange of persons which has taken place under the Colombo Plan and other international aid programmes. This must have expanded the vision and stimulated the initiative of many Asians. Allied with the undoubted drive for development already present in Asia through other causes and the presence of equipment in greater variety than ever before, it may thus provide the necessary catalyst for indigenous enterprise by private individuals. But it is much too early yet to judge.

7. Prospect.

Fundamental Colombo Plan aims have not changed since 1950, nor has the Australian Government's conception of them. In part, Colombo Plan aims were economic, both in terms of economic advancement in Asia itself and in the much wider terms of world trade and investment. The London Report said that "the conception of the Commonwealth countries' approach to the problem is that a fresh impetus should be given to economic development in South and South-East Asia in order to increase production, raise standards of living, and thus enlarge the volume of trade around the world from which all countries may benefit."¹⁴ These may have been the key objectives for some governments in 1950. The basic objective may have been to stimulate a new infusion of dollars into the world payments system, as well as to expand non-dollar production. Although expansion of Asian production is still obviously the over-riding

13. Chapter XIV, para. 41.

14. Cmd. 8080, p. 3.

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aim of the Plan, the additional interest, for all Western countries, has moved increasingly to the Plan's political implications.

The Plan's political objectives have never been expressed in precise terms. However, in the cautious, and somewhat ambiguous language of Consultative Committee Reports, they are:

- (i) To overcome the political effects of low living standards;
- (ii) To assist newly independent governments to establish themselves on a secure basis;
- (iii) To enable these governments especially "to strengthen their free institutions";
- (iv) To assist "social stability" by promoting economic improvement; and
- (v) To assist "the political stability of the area, and indeed of the world . . . and to strengthen the cause of freedom."

The southward march of communism has heightened the note of urgency surrounding these objectives: it increases the threat to political stability, to freedom and to social stability in the whole of South and South-East Asia, and, at the same time, communist doctrine claims—plausibly, in some Asian ears—to have found a specific—a sort of "wonder drug" cure—for low living standards. Paradoxically, in the light of Marxist dogma, communism will continue to have its strongest appeal, not in the highly developed economies where the welfare state is well advanced, but in underdeveloped countries like those in Asia where low levels of production operate against emergence of the welfare state within a free political system. The Colombo Plan provides a vehicle through which the democracies can demonstrate that they have an answer to the problem of low living standards that is as positive and dynamic as anything the communists can offer—and that has equal popular appeal.

In recent policy statements, the Australian Government has re-stated its belief in economic co-operation, both for its own sake, and as a buttress for any political or military organisation in South and South-East Asia. Mr. Casey said in the House on 10th August, 1954: "If there is to be a healthy political life in South-East Asia, there must be a healthy economic life. We must sustain and if possible increase the flow of economic aid into South-East Asia, and, when possible, play a part in easing the economic difficulties of the region."

There have been official suggestions that this co-operation might be extended in specific ways. For example, in the same statement, Mr. Casey told the House that most South-East Asian countries—

... have vulnerable and not very well developed economies. They export raw materials and primary produce and use the proceeds for such imports as they need to build up their countries industrially. Since the price of their products depends primarily on the demands of the markets in the Western world, these markets have a direct and powerful influence on the economies of Asia. This in turn can give rise to a feeling of resentment against what is sometimes felt as a dependence on the West. The commercial policy of the

Western world is therefore a matter of considerable importance, not only for the economies of Asia, but also for its politics.

It follows that straight-out economic aid may not always be the best means of easing the economic difficulties of the region. For example, if there were a catastrophic fall in the prices of staple commodities such as rubber, the result in economic dislocation and suffering might play straight into the hands of the communists. Consequently international action to sustain prices in such situations, might do much more than direct international economic aid.¹⁵

This is one of the Colombo Plan's problems. There are many others. For example, the Plan has to strike a balance between immediate needs and the needs of long-term development. It must also meet a situation that is constantly changing. Planning must therefore be flexible and must not adhere to arrangements that swiftly changing circumstances have outmoded. The planners, both Asian and non-Asian, must therefore see their task as constant in its major elements but ever-changing in points of detail.

Asian development calls too for thinking in terms of an economic revolution. For long-term needs, a mere extension of present activities and modes of production into new areas will not do. Extension of the agricultural frontier, although perhaps solving immediate crises, will not alone solve Asia's fundamental economic problems. Asia's is basically a Malthusian problem, with population constantly pressing against food supply. To develop new areas for peasant use by irrigation, drainage, or other means will only momentarily relieve this pressure. The point must soon be reached where the limits to agricultural exploitation, by peasant means, are final. The correct approach requires that, before these limits are reached, the planners will establish or accelerate a trend in Asian countries of the kind that has revolutionised European economies in the past one hundred and fifty years. This requires the grafting on to Asian societies of the best in capitalist thinking and attitudes, as well as techniques.

To re-state the Colombo Plan's problems and objectives recalls their complexity, especially when the intangibles involved are taken into account. But progress has already been made. The final paragraph of the Ottawa Report says that—

The future still holds many problems, and the countries of the area are under no illusions about the magnitude of the efforts required. But the fact that against the background of the economic difficulties analysed in last year's report they have been able to spend 27% more on development in the last year than in the preceding year shows that they have responded to the spur and the challenge which those difficulties presented. They are aware that the main burden must be borne on their own resources, though external aid can do much to smooth and to accelerate the progress towards a higher standard of living. But they have come through the initial difficulties, and not as isolated entities but as members of a great and growing partnership animated by a common purpose and increasingly conscious of each other's problems and aspirations.

That furnishes some general guide to future prospects, although it may be a somewhat optimistic one.

15. Statement by the Minister for External Affairs, in the House of Representatives, 10th August, 1954.

NOTES

The Vietminh

G. Fairbairn

Now that the Viet Bac, the forest region of North Tongking, has proved to be a second Yenan — as it has long been intended that it should be — it is important to consider the nature and achievements of the Vietminh. Of all the para-military organisations under the Soviet Communist banner in South-East Asia it alone has so far proved truly formidable. Its special position and its special achievement should be neither over- nor under-estimated. It is essential that the acrid myths which followed the Communist victory in China should not obscure this debacle. The truth, as nearly always, lies in the nuances. But as this form of perfervidly political, guerrilla-cum-regular warfare has long been a major plank in the world communist platform,¹ and as its importance will quite obviously increase in the near future, it is necessary to start appraising the Vietminh's success in an objective way.

Despite its international implications and its close similarity in some ways to the Chinese pattern, the Vietminh movement (party and army would be more accurate) cannot properly be torn from its national context. Since 1943, until fairly recently, it has been the sole and obvious heir to what is probably the most vital nationalist tradition in South-East Asia. An assiduous student could trace examples of implacable nationalism on no small scale right back to the September days of 1858, when the Franco-Spanish expedition captured Tourane.² Within a very few years of the final pacification — the French were not even nominal masters of Tongking until 1897 — the Vietnamese saw the great Russian fleet sheltering in Camranh Bay before steaming north to its shattering and widely publicised defeat in the Straits of Tsushima at the hands of an Asian power. A year later Vietnamese students in Japan were already writing home arranging the formation of secret societies "to prepare the population for the future."³ Before World War I demonstrations, assassinations, and even "revolutionary banks" had begun in earnest. The inter-war years saw the definitive failure of the non-revolutionary nationalists⁴ and a consequent increase of support for the revolutionaries; the entrance upon the scene (in the late twenties) of the Communists and the slow, not particularly impressive, growth of their prestige which they had to share with the Kuomintang-orientated V.Q.D.D.

It was World War II which gave the Communists a series of chances for which they could scarcely have hoped in their wildest dreams. After an almost disastrous start — the abortive rising in Cochin China in

1. In particular since Miss Smedley, Mr. Snow, etc., told the world about Yenan. Miss Smedley even claimed indirectly to have contributed to the "partisan" indoctrination of the U.S. Marine Corps!

2. See e.g. "Viet-Nam; Sociologie d'une Guerre," by Paul Mus.

3. "French Policy and Developments in Indo-China" by T. E. Ennis.

4. This phase is clearly outlined in M. Philippe Devillers' "Histoire du Viet-Nam."

November, 1940—the Communists, exiled in Yunnan, convoked a congress at Tsin Tsi in May, 1941, which drew up a programme of great importance. With the obvious exception of ephemeral wartime commitments, it remains to-day the “theoretical” basis of the Vietminh party. Besides an unexceptional list of aims concerning the eight-hour day, workers’ assurance, and so on, it displays a prudent moderation with regard to “agrarian reform” — that is, only the lands of Frenchmen and “collaborators” were ipso facto, redistributable — to which the Vietminh has, it seems, continuously adhered.

On September 8, Nguyen-ai-Quoc (as he was still called) made his appeal to Tongking in the name of the Vietminh, an independence party which was, in fact, formed and led by the Central Committee of the Indo-Chinese Communist Party, from the beginning. Early in 1943, the Vietminh, now led by “Ho Chi Minh,” received its first great gift from providence: the Kuomintang decided to substitute it for the V.Q.D.D. as its subsidised intelligence agency for Indo-China. The Vietminh also acquired and long held the support of the U.S. Office of Strategic Services operating from Chungking. Its next piece of great good fortune was the Japanese coup of March 9, 1945, which destroyed the entire French administration, including the armed services. Add to this the efficiency of U.S. bombing, which cut North-South communications at a time of famine (probably exacerbated by Vietminh pillaging of rice stocks);⁵ the swift rise in prices following the end of administrative control; and the consequent prevalence of speculation — and a first-class revolutionary situation was there, ready-made.

On August 10, Ho gave the order for a general insurrection. “But the last word still remained with the Japanese . . .” who decided “to cede their position not to their conquerors but to those who could best continue their historic task of liberating Asia from White imperialism.”⁶ On August 25, the imperial regime, very briefly re-established by the Japanese as a last resort, disappeared without the least incident. On August 25, 1945, the gesture was perfectly clear to the population: the Vietminh had succeeded to the imperial power, to the Mandate of Heaven itself. The days following can be scarcely over-estimated. In the words of the youngest officer of the Vietminh, “I was at the summit of glory and pride.”⁷ This seemed to be the consummation of a long, incredibly courageous struggle for national independence.

There followed other set-backs for the French: the delay in obtaining transport vessels for their troops, the deliberate obstructive tactics of the Yunnan Government; but by then French prestige had suffered irreparably. However, what Colonel Sainteny (the French Commissioner in Hanoi) called “le jeu Sino-Américain” certainly thwarted the French come-back in no small way.⁸

5. 6. Devillers op. cit.

7. In a letter to the present writer.

8. See Colonel Sainteny's articles, “Le Figaro” 14/12/53 ff.

Now this assumption of the Mandate of Heaven by the Vietminh as a result of the August Revolution is fundamental to the whole struggle in Viet-Nam. The re-emergence in the Twentieth Century of Authority (at the demand, this time, of the masses themselves) should make it easier to understand the dismay of an Asian nation, which had very recently enjoyed a restricted but coherent, all-embracing but (to it) entirely rational vision of life, when it found itself being pushed towards a form of social anarchy by forces it seldom understood and generally detested. This is not, of course, to say that many Vietnamese intellectuals did not understand and appreciate aspects of French culture; and by a curious irony, as M. Paul Mus points out, no one was more "European" in some ways than the Communists.⁹ But the point about Communism in Viet-Nam (and elsewhere in Asia) is that it means quite different things to the intellectuals and to the peasants. Of this the Vietminh Communist leadership has been well aware and it has trimmed its sails accordingly. For instance the expression for the Communist Party of Indo-China in the Vietnamese language was discarded not only as a tactical necessity but also because it rested on foreign values opposed to the traditional plane of thought. Again, the land policy is specifically non-Communist; it respects and even assures the local structures of common living. In general, as M. Mus remarks, "in the perspectives of the Far East, by its double principle of rationality and authority, controlling the truth in everything . . . (Communism) presents itself without difficulty as a Way, Tao . . . not without precedents, though on different foundations, in the history of state religions in Asia, which virtually is the history of Asia."

At this point attention should be directed to another, often grossly misconceived aspect of the East-West encounter; the reaction of the Asian people to the introduction of Western technology. Bolstered by the popularity of Professor Toynbee's occasional pieces, in which he has done everything to avoid facing the unpleasant reality of an increasing polarisation of the world¹⁰, certain general assumptions about Western civilisation have permitted technology to be regarded as the "entering wedge" (Toynbee) of a potential world-civilisation, or at any rate a new form of world unity. But as a critic of Professor Toynbee has put it, "A Christian in a southern Indian village is not a Westerner . . . Still less is a Mongol soldier a Westerner because he is taken into battle on a truck built on the upper Volga with a machine carbine manufactured near Irkutsk."¹¹ M. Muss provides some chastening examples of the average Vietnamese's view of Western skills. He describes how the French-made bus altogether alters its function in the new environment and becomes an intimate part in the local life. He describes how the peasant will say

9. This passage is based on M. Paul Mus op. cit.

10. This theory throws up remarks which almost suggest that the test of a "Westerner" is the possession of an American bank account, e.g. "The recent victory of Communism in China over a Western civilisation" . . . etc. Toynbee: "The World and the West," p. 65.

11. Michal Vyvan: The Cambridge Journal, June, 1950.

to the Frenchman: "Yes, you press the button on your camera but who has the secret of extracting the picture? The Vietnamese photographic expert in the nearby town." Or again: "Your motor cars? Oh yes, but who knows how to drive and repair them? You or your Vietnamese chauffeurs?" This is the sort of magnificently absurd national pride which has made the Vietminh's subtle exploitation of nationalism so much easier.

There is one more background factor which should be remarked. It is not necessary for a European to read Kautsky to detect at least a potentially overwhelming element of determinism in Communism, which in an Asian setting might well be attractive to the well-known "Oriental fatalism." Mao's writings at times show this to be a far from fanciful interpretation and his writings are of great importance elsewhere. Mao holds up the peasantry as a tempest or torrent, burying beneath it the forces of imperialism, militarism, corruption: "All the revolutionary parties, all the revolutionary comrades, pass before its scrutiny and it accepts them or rejects them."¹² Communism itself, far from being an instigator, merely accepts—and, no doubt, guides—the inevitable. There are Vietnamese precedents for this catastrophic doctrine, even if in a more bizarre form. For example, a pseudo-Celestial Emperor once marched against the French with a few comrades and magical charms, waiting for the elements to do the rest.¹³ It is more than possible that the weather eye of the Vietnamese peasant may come to see a new cosmos in Communism where others see only an historical monstrosity; a natural mutation where others see only a fortuitous and temporary seizure of power. In that case the Vietminh will have succeeded to more than the outward trappings of the Heavenly Mandate.

However, until time or terror sanctifies them, ideologies are little more than recruiting speeches in a struggle for power. It is therefore necessary to descend from political "metaphysics" to the observation of the struggle itself. Apart from sketchy bulletins, information from the Democratic Republic has been scarce. During the important debate in Paris in October 1953, even *"L'Humanite"* had to content itself with the sparse evidence and (even by Communist standards) naive comment of a young American Communist. M. Sartre's *"Les Temps Modernes"* devoted almost a whole issue (Aug. Sept. '53) to the war but its chief source for its all-important study of the "popular Army" was Mr. Belden's delicious panegyric, "China Shakes the World." However, despite this, some examination of the available material might help to clarify to a certain extent the kind of struggle it was until the French, tired of a war they never learned how to wage, decided to break it off in circumstances which themselves assured the destruction of the Vietnamese who were prepared to fight the Vietminh.

12. Quoted in Paul Mus op. cit.

13. Cp. The Saya San rebellion in Burma in 1930.

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To get the Vietminh effort into perspective it is first of all necessary to appreciate the perennial difficulties of combating guerilla warfare, as well as the special nature of this war. The exasperated language of occupying powers in the face of an insurrection of the guerilla type is to-day well known:

"As it was impossible to afford adequate protection, villages which aided the enemy were treated with consideration. Flying columns were discouraged. If the people were friendly they were certain to suffer when the column retired. If they were hostile . . . they looked upon the retirement as a retreat." Or again: "When the Government was able to drive the insurgents out of villages, more often than not, it could not spare the men to garrison the places, with the result that the insurgents came back to wreck reprisals on those suspected of co-operation with the Army." The first quotation relates to the British pacification of Upper Burma in 1886; the second is extracted from the Rangoon "Nation" of March 10th, 1954 describing the present insurrection.¹⁴

The problem in the Red River delta is described by a French Correspondent: "The villagers are interrogated in the normal way: 'Who fired on us?' The village chief bows trembling, saying nothing—there are at least two or three members of the Vietminh cell amongst the apparently terrified group standing behind him. If the chief talks he will be killed that evening when the French move on to occupy the next village. If he keeps silent, will (the French) shoot him? No, but he will be harrassed, bullied, and undoubtedly humiliated and, more often than not, is turned into an implacable enemy."¹⁵ Whether popular or not, the Vietminh was at least both invisible and permanent. Now a guerilla army cannot operate without support from the population — as Mao put it, the army lives in the population as the fish lives in the sea—and it is idle to pretend otherwise. But that is not necessarily the same thing as popularity. Anyway to-day these speculations are irrelevant; they probably always are irrelevant in a civil war. Such wars, like many other wars, are won by preponderant force properly deployed.

Mao's second principle of guerilla warfare was: "He who holds the countryside does not need to attack the cities; they will fall of their own accord when the time is ripe," that is, when the counter-offensive can be mounted by the insurgent army. The Vietminh organised a regular army of six infantry and one heavy divisions, equipped by China and its cadres trained in China, supported by 100,000 regional troops and an innumerable mass of guerillas (the du kich). "Free Vietnam is first of all an Army;" the Popular Army is the expression of the people, the example to the people; the Army organises the people, incarnates the people— so

14. It should be noticed that it has taken three divisions of troops, an enormous police force, and 200,000 home guards to quell the Malayan insurrection, whose regular irregulars have never numbered more than 5,000, an insurrection which no one outside the Communist camp has ever maintained was a national uprising.

15. M. Jacques Lacouture in "Politique Etrangere," May-July, 1953. See also: "Operation Gachis" in Les Temps Modernes, Aug-Sept., 53.

run the heady slogans of this formidable society. The base of this "living pyramid" is the Militia, a para-military mass organisation which assures local defence, prepares the way for the general counter-offensive, furnishes manpower for the "auxiliary services" (i.e. coolies) during large operations, and is the source for reinforcements. Next come the regional troops. Each area had to provide an independent company, each province a regiment. They have had the toughest assignment of all, being responsible for protecting the precious regular formations, lacking the safe rest periods the latter enjoyed, and usually receiving a slightly smaller rice ration.¹⁶ The regular army though it took part in what were regarded as vital defensive operations—for example, Phu Nhu Quan in '48, Hoa Binh in '51—was supposed to concentrate on mounting the counter-offensive. As it happened, it was the distant city of Paris which "fell" when the time was "ripe"; the vital Red River delta was never conquered and at least eleven million lived in the Franco-Vietnamese zone when France decided to lower its flag. Even so, the French Expeditionary Corps did by that time face the real possibility of outright defeat.

It was in the villages—sprawling nests of hamlets in the delta areas—that the Vietminh steadily wore away at Franco-Vietnamese authority. The aim was to have in every village a Vietminh executive committee, the so-called representatives of the "interim power."¹⁷ This committee appears to have been modelled on the local, French-type Council of Notables, and besides such normal affairs as rival Courts, Customs Collectors and Police, it controlled an Intelligence group (i.e. active espionage), an Assassination Committee, a Self-defence Group, and—watching everything—the Secret Police. "They are there permanently; and only disappear in the event of a patrol, for a couple of hours or in the event of an operation, for a day. The remainder of the time they are masters."¹⁸ The Vietnamese village was made for this sort of warfare; its layout defied systematic search; double walls, underground tunnels (often on several levels), stables occupied by unpleasant buffaloes, interminable bamboo thickets and rush-covered streams made the task of search parties all but hopeless. After they went, the executions began if anyone had talked.¹⁹ Only one group could have coped with this form of warfare; the anti-Communist Vietnamese. But the French were never prepared to gamble on them.

But despite the efficacy of Vietminh methods and its considerable achievement, the war always remained in some senses a limited one—and in a sense favourable to an austere, indigenous guerilla army. The New China News Agency would solemnly announce that the Vietminh had achieved a favourable trade balance in inter-zonal commerce; or the

16. *Logistique Vietminh*: "Indochine-Sud East Asie" March, 1953.

17. *Lettres d'Indochine*, by Guy de Chaumont-Guitry, a French Intelligence officer highly critical of the French effort.

18. *ibid.*

19. See "Operation Gachis," Lacouture *op. cit.*

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the Vietminh Review of Public Works would complain of persistent smuggling from the "Occupied Zone." A young American Communist observer gravely reported of the Vietminh zone: "Peasants are taught not to buy the perfumed soaps, the alcoholic beverages, and other unnecessary goods . . . (from the French Zone)."²⁰ It was mid-1951 before the Vietnamese Nationalist Premier announced a customs cordon around the Red delta and before mobilisation was begun. A British legionnaire wrote of the South: "It is a huge involved pirate war . . . a war without a front for the most part and without clear-cut allegiances."²¹ However, the Vietminh "stood the distance" best—at its back was China and, as every Vietnamese knew, one day the French (increasingly alienated from the population by the exigencies of warfare) would disappear across the seas.

Some of the reasons for the Vietminh staying-power have been touched upon here. But the important point is this—and its importance is not confined to Vietnam—that the Vietminh was an armed Communist "society" of a type which the free world has not yet learned to counter. Moreover, Geneva (however much statesmen may talk about negotiations) was, and will be eloquently publicised as, a victory for this form of society—and not merely for Vietnamese nationalism.

Consider the following incident, which could have occurred anywhere in the Communist world:

"The charge against you is treason (Viet-Gian)'

"The word was part of the new vocabulary. Viet: Vietnamese. Gian: Dishonest, traitorous. The Press had made great use of this term of Chinese origin since the Japanese seizure of power.

"Why have you engaged in the politics of brutalising the people? . . . The Revolution wants neither slaughter nor suffering. But errors must be expiated . . . Here is paper, pen and ink . . . Examine your conscience. That is all.' " The ex-mandarin writes and signs.²²

And there is the testimony of the captured French soldier:

"I could kill you, you know that?' the young Commissar said.

"Naturally. We are your prisoners.'

"I could kill you in revenge for those you have killed here in Viet-Nam. But I shan't. You aren't responsible, you are only the colonialists' cannon-fodder. They exploit you as they exploit the Vietnamese people. So you will be well treated.'

"He dismissed us with a cigarette and a smile.

"He has the gift of the gab,' I whispered."²³

Those two incidents illuminate the nature of the Vietminh perhaps better than prolonged analyses of its tactical propaganda.²⁴

20. J. Starobin: "Viet-Nam Fights for Freedom," and in "L'Humanite," Oct., '53.

21. "Strange Company," by Adrian Liddell-Hart.

22. "Les Chemins de la Revolte," by Nguyen-Tien-Lang.

23. "Quinze Mois Prisonnier chez Viets," by Claude Goldthieux.

24. For an important analysis of the role of the Indo-Chinese Communist Party in the Vietminh see "Australia Quarterly," September, 1954.

Kenya Impressions

Beatrice Agnew

No feeling of evil had reached me when I passed the Rift Valley on my first day in Kenya, only peace and much beauty were there. It was December 14, 1951, and my first impression was of a mysterious, peaceful and unbelievably beautiful countryside with a note of serenity everywhere; at a road house, native servants in white kanzus (long coats), red belts and caps moved deftly from table to table, serving good food with courtesy and respect.

The one hundred and fifty miles car drive from Nairobi to Molo included an ascent from five thousand to nine thousand feet above sea level. The White Highlands reminded me of Wiltshire and parts of Australia; there was undulating country with here and there plantations of blue gums standing boldly against the unclouded African sky. I knew that all I had heard of Kenya was no exaggeration.

How acceptable was the fire that burned in the sitting-room of the grey stone house on the hill where Kipsigis house servants clustered outside the kitchen, exited at the arrival of a memsahib from Australia. Smiling, they welcomed me with the conventional greeting: "Jambo, memsahib!" then carried my luggage inside.

Three months were spent in peace. A garden was laid out and came to life; in it a bibi (woman) worked from eight until noon each day. Earrings of closely threaded, multicoloured beads hung almost to her shoulders and on her wrists she wore bracelets of the same design. She was young and very pretty, and worked faster than any man or woman I had ever seen gardening in a white country. Ten Teriki totos (children) in charge of an overseer sang as they dug in the vegetable garden. Wattles bloomed hesitatingly, but lovely, in clumps by the roadside, and English flowers grew in profusion.

A visit to Nanyuki cast the first doubt in my mind as to the peace and loveliness of all parts of Kenya. Thorn trees trimmed by giraffe to umbrella shapes stood hard, forbidding, and covered in dust. Wilderbeeste, konkoni (deer) and zebra grazed by the roadside and the March sun was hot. Only Mt. Kenya looked cool, snowcapped and serene, sometimes entirely hidden by clouds which at times coquettishly revealed her beauty from varying angles.

Sagana Lodge, Kenya's wedding present to Princess Elizabeth was not very far away, and the little church where she and her consort worshipped but a pleasant afternoon's drive.

Near Timau there is a valley which was at one time the home of the Kikuyu tribe. "Not so many years ago," my friend remarked, "the Kikuyu were almost exterminated by the Masai (African tribe); then the British came with missionaries and medicine and the Kikuyu tribe grew strong and increased in numbers. An intelligent tribe, the good ones excellent, but the

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bad ones cunning and treacherous." A shudder ran through me. What was brewing in the deep valley, I wondered.

I was glad to leave Nanyuki. its dust and continual bush fires, some caused by carelessness and others by mischievous intent. Those who loved Nyeri and Nanyuki assured me that when the rains came the countryside would respond and be beautiful, green, and dustless once more—there would be no bush fires then, they said. With relief I returned to Molo, where no atmosphere of evil lurked and the farms smiled a welcome in brown and red ploughed fields.

Three months was hardly long enough to form a true impression, but the one I took away with me was of sunshine, a happy farming community, English, Scottish, Irish and Australian, which worked hard and played hard under delightful conditions.

The best of England and Australia, the two worlds I knew and understood, were packed into the White Highlands, blended there into a perfect whole—the backgrounds of old civilisation and conventionality tempered by the vision and free life of the colonial. East Africa seemed to hold the secret of life for its white community—work, leisure and ideal conditions.

The African natives with whom I came in contact seemed happy and pleasant; lazy, perhaps, but ready to laugh. I was loth to continue my journey to England just when I had learnt a little of the language and was beginning to understand the native in some small degree . . .

It was August 24, 1952, and on Waterloo Station I saw Sunday papers spread out to catch the eye of the passerby. Walking slowly past I wondered if I should buy a copy to read in the train. PLOT TO MURDER ALL EUROPEANS IN KENYA stood out on a front page. With an unsteady hand I exchanged pennies for the evil tidings.

There had been no mention of any disturbance in letters to me from Kenya, but now I read of Mau Mau for the first time. Oaths were administered and taken, terrible beyond description, flouting the very deepest of African tribal tabus, utterly ruthless. It was the Kikuyu tribe which had conceived this terror and the towns mentioned as hotbeds of Mau Mau were NYERI and NANYUKI. Only the day before I had seen my son on to a plane bound for Nairobi en route for Nanyuki.

"Don't worry," an English friend assured me. "Sunday papers are apt to have spectacular headlines; we shall probably never hear the word Mau Mau again."

By November there were headlines in the London papers and the battle was in progress. A State of Emergency had been proclaimed.

Those to whom Kenya meant nothing turned to more cheerful reading; colonials on leave or ex-Kenyan settlers wrote letters to the editor suggesting a solution of the trouble.

I returned to the White Highlands on November 19 to find Molo comparatively unperturbed, but Nyeri and Nanyuki seething with unrest. The foothills of the Aberdare Mountains, so lovely to look upon, had been

the stage for three murders. In one instance an aged man who had lived in Kenya many years and grown to love her people, was murdered in his bath, betrayed by his own house servants who, threatened by terrorists, had revealed the time of day when their master was most vulnerable. Europeans, whose whole adult life had been spent improving conditions for the natives, were murdered—children torn limb from limb. When the Europeans carried weapons as a matter of course, and two women on a lonely farm repulsed their attackers, Mau Mau turned its attention to loyal Kikuyu chiefs who stood for law and order—they were murdered.

Kikuyu women were even more ruthless than the men. The Devons, Buffs and Black Watch Regiments arrived in Kenya from Korea and Malaya; there was concentrated battle in the Aberdare Mountains and gangs of terrorists escaped to roam the forest.

The attitude of Europeans I met was never one of fear for themselves. Sometimes an unspoken anxiety over a son or husband who was out on a mounted patrol, and obvious relief at his return. There was an attitude of annoyance and incredulity that such a situation should occur in this land of theirs. "The insolence! How dare they! It can't last long. Ridiculous!" Then news would come that a member of their family or a close friend had been murdered. Once more it was anger, not fear.

Missionaries were blamed; their medical supplies had prevented epidemics from killing off Kikuyus and the education in missionary schools gave the African an exalted idea of himself—there were too many would-be clerks with inflated notions, when the African's place was serving the European even if Africa were his native land and the white man an outsider in the first place! Had not the British given the African all the advantages he had, and raised him from savagery to a share in Western civilisation?

The old settlers shook their heads—Mau Mau was a gross impertinence, but easily quelled if strong measures were enforced at once. The loyal Kikuyus asked for permission to deal with it in their own way—British Justice, which maintained that a man was innocent until he was proved guilty was no good. Mau Mau was bad and Mau Mau terrorists must be dealt with at once in the only way they understood, and that was death.

The Colonial Office shook its head. Mission stations of all denominations were raided. Missionaries whose lives were given to teaching and nursing the African were murdered, but the loyal Kikuyu—a mystic—gave his life blood for the faith and denounced that evil thing called Mau Mau.

The farming community cursed the Police Meetings, the Mounted Patrols, Ambushes, Night Raids on farms where an oath-taking ceremony might be taking place. It was so hard to get the harvest in, and storms would not wait until Kenya Police Reserve duties permitted the farmer to harvest his crops.

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The Colonial Office worked slowly, whereas to the impatient white community in Kenya there was not a minute to be wasted. They considered missionaries should never have been allowed to set foot in Kenya and that the African preferred the hut which he shared with his dogs, cats and native hens, and he wanted no Western civilisation. Meanwhile, the Government of Kenya gave its support to missionary work in the battle against Mau Mau with better results than many settlers realised.

In a government school for Africans at Kericho, the headmistress was a very splendid person whose father had been an American Quaker missionary near Lake Victoria. She shared his belief that the African is happiest working with his hands. So her girls were taught to cook, sew, knit and weave at Kericho and were happy and industrious.

What is to happen to Kenya? Is it time the European got away before he is forced out? What of the rapidly increasing Indian population? What does the African really want of us who, in bygone days, have boasted of our colonial policy? Before we ever heard of Russian Communism our stated aim was to better the conditions of the people we conquered, teach them to govern themselves, give them the secrets of the West, and leave them alone, perhaps making some profit for ourselves in the process, but intending ultimately to go.

Can this present breach be healed? Has Mau Mau injured the prestige of the white man beyond repair? I do not think so.

If we can show that British Justice stands for law and order and is prepared to kill to enforce it, we can show the African that we understand that he wants land and are prepared to give him more than he now has in suitable areas without taking it from whites who have worked hard and deserve to keep their portion—for he understands and respects fairness; if we can show him that Democracy is something better than Communism, and if we can respect his mysticism (for fundamentally he is a mystic) and not take away his gods without substituting a real Christian way of life, not lip service to a distant Bwana (master) God who does not mean a thing to him, then I believe we may still feel that Kenya is British East Africa and not be ashamed to meet the ghosts of those who, with vision and sincerity, saw an Africa which would always be an integral part of the British Empire.

But we must be prepared to work beside representatives of Africans and Asians, not against them. Those of us who cannot bring ourselves to accept a new order which is inevitable must sorrowfully say farewell to the Kenya we have known, and start again in a white country.

To those who have the African's welfare at heart there are many ways in which we can still help him, not lose our prestige and yet lead the life we find so pleasant and make Mau Mau but a dim memory of a passing storm which heralded a new, a finer Kenya.

BOOK REVIEWS

ESSAYS ON SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: By Karl Mannheim—Edited by Paul Kecskemeti, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1953. 319 pages.

The late Karl Mannheim was a sufficiently important figure in the social sciences for even minor writings from his pen to command interest and respect. This alone would justify the present collection of essays, some of them for the first time published in English. Nor in fact are they all "minor writings" save in the sense in which articles lectures and the like are less important than books, or studies preparing the ground for some exhaustive treatise, less important than this. The essays on "Conservative Thought" or "The History of the Concept of the State," for example, are as fundamental as Mannheim's major works, being in fact frequently cited in them. Others exemplify Mannheim's broad interests, in philosophy, psychology, history and politics no less than in his special field, sociology. Above all, the collection of essays, ranging over some fifteen years, well illustrates Mannheim's development as a thinker.

The earliest contribution (dating back to 1922), a doctoral thesis on "Structural Analysis of Epistemology," is a curiously old-fashioned piece of writing, redolent of the stale, heavy atmosphere of German academic philosophy at the turn of the century. But it already announces what was to become Mannheim's predominant interest, the foundations of human knowledge, and in a roundabout way it even foreshadows his final theoretical position. In the thesis, Mannheim assumes the existence of a "unique norm of correctness," that is, of something like an absolute criterion of truth: while the whole trend of Mannheim's more mature work is to argue the opposite. But the thesis also qualifies this assumption of absolute norms; it concedes that these need not be satisfied by the various historical embodiments of human knowledge or, indeed, by human knowledge "until the end of time" (p.30), and that ideas, theories, and all the other "creations of the mind" are not free to emerge at all times. Rather, they are subject to the requirements of "historico-philosophical contemporaneity," being capable of materialising only in certain periods and in conformity with the "cultural manifestations of the epoch" (p.p. 38-9). In Mannheim's later writings the qualification comes to overrule the assumption. The validity of human knowledge, in all its forms, is held to be strictly "relational," being dependent on the social-historical setting, and explained by it, as the forms of knowledge themselves are determined by the social forces at work in the given situation. Such is, in essence, Mannheim's Sociology of Knowledge, which is undoubtedly his major contribution to modern sociological thought.

It is not an idle question to ask what caused this change in Mannheim's thinking. Given a theory like this, the question at once suggests itself, and the theory should be capable of answering it. For if it is true that all forms of human knowledge are ultimately reflections of the social situation in which they take shape, then this must apply to his own new sociological theory no less than to the social theories of earlier thinkers—Aristotle, Kant, Hegel and others—which Mannheim examines from this point of view. Now Louis Wirth, in his preface to Mannheim's *Ideology and Utopia*, suggests that the searching analysis of society presented in this book was in no small measure the outcome of the social and intellectual upheaval that marked the Germany of the late 'twenties, where Mannheim first wrote and taught. Mannheim himself thinks on similar lines when he calls the growth of German sociology since 1918 (of which he was so outstanding an exponent) a "product of one of the greatest social dissolutions and reorganisations" (p. 210). It is only a short step to saying that a theory like Mannheim's, denying all autonomy and absoluteness to human knowledge, could have had no more fitting birthplace than the battleground of opposing ideologies, creeds, and doctrines, the Germany of 1920-1933.

I am not presenting this as a serious proof of Mannheim's tenets. What I have said is little better than an intelligent *aperçu*, a plausible generalisation, half intuitive

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and half commonsense—the sort of vaguely convincing remark historians are fond of making. Yet it is precisely this kind of persuasiveness which attaches to many of the generalisations advanced by Mannheim. Far be it from me to deny the usefulness of a judicious mixture of commonsense and intuition (often brilliant in Mannheim's case). But what we must deny is that it amounts to science and that it substantiates Mannheim's explicit claim to have devised a new scientific approach to vital problems of human society.

In the present volume this approach is best exemplified in the essay on Conservative Thought, first published (in German) in 1925. The argument proceeds by three steps. The first is to establish that there exist pervasive "styles of thought," "ways of thinking" about the world, physical and social, which characterise all the cognitive efforts of a period or people. "Conservative thought" belongs in this category. It is more than a label for a particular political creed; it corresponds to an embracing *Weltanschauung* equally manifest in art and literary creations, in economic theories, in religious and moral persuasions, even in the canons of strict science. Secondly, "conservatism" in the narrower, social-political sense, must be distinguished from mere "traditionalism," that is, from the tacit, unquestioned acceptance of inherited beliefs and practices. Conservatism is traditionalism rendered "conscious" and "reflective," in response to external threats and to changes or crises undermining this unquestioned acceptance. In other words, in conservatism the adherence to tradition acquires an explicit, defensive ideology. The threats against which this defence is needed will vary with the circumstances: thus the development of modern conservatism "is due in the last resort to the dynamic character of the modern world" and to the changes wrought by the emergence of "a class society" (p.101). Thirdly and finally, a similar genesis from social causes is ascribed to all other "creations of the mind" and intellectual trends, producing ultimately those uniform "styles of thought," of which rationalism and romanticism are further examples.

Mannheim's conception of these unities of thought is closely akin to the familiar attempts of contemporary German philosophers and historians, such as Dilthey, Spranger, Lamprecht or Woelfflin, to construct "types" of historical societies and civilisations. Unlike the protagonists of the typological school, Mannheim predicates not only the unity of thought as such, and perhaps its roots somewhere in the minds of men, but a unity which has a definite centre and precise causes—the set of conditions he calls "social." But how definite or precise is this conception of a social determinacy? Though many of Mannheim's examples suggest that the relevant social causes are political or economic ones, he explicitly denies that "political action is always the centre around which styles of thought crystallise" (p. 83) and similarly rejects the Marxist view assigning primacy to economic factors. Instead, he acknowledges the great complexity of conditions, which cannot without distortion be reduced to any simple category of causes. But he suggests no method of further analysis; so that the assumption of a causally effective "total situation," correct though it may be, amounts to little more than a broad working hypothesis. Nor does Mannheim attempt to analyse more precisely the varying character of the causation itself. It seems to be all the same whether a particular "style of thought" arises in the form of an ideology designed to buttress a social system (as political doctrines would endorse a political practice); as an intellectual or emotional reaction to an uncongenial social situation (as when "romanticism" comes to oppose "bourgeois capitalism" and its philosophical concomitant, rationalism—p.89); or simply as the logical counterpart or "parallel" of economic and other developments (as when "quantitative modern science" is said to evolve in harmony with the emergent "capitalist organisation"—p.87).

We are thus left with vaguely uniform processes of causation, with vague blanket terms for the causes themselves ("social forces," "social situation," "social factors,") and, occasionally, with near-truisms; to wit, this passage taken from the essay on the Concept of the State:

"The unifying *Weltanschauung*, the styles of thought in their turn, are not absolute entities. They do not appear out of the blue, but are somewhere connected with social history (p.p. 181-2)."

Both the vagueness and risk of truisms grow less when Mannheim concerns himself, not broadly with "patterns of social activities" and "patterns of thought" but,

more concretely, with specified activities and specific "ways of thinking." Thus, while there seems to be little point in saying that "styles of thought" themselves phenomenal in the history of societies are "connected with social history," it is relevant to relate "the changing forms of (political) concepts to the changing practice of political life," and to assert that "although there was a constant interchange of ideas between the natural sciences and politics, it was ultimately always the change of political practice which shaped the concepts of political science" (p 166).

Even this sounds a little commonplace. Perhaps it was not so when the essay was written, and when it might still have needed stressing that ideas, say, about the State were not entirely spontaneous "creations of the mind" but had something to do with the current efforts (or their failures) at political organisation. Perhaps, too, it may seem unfair to criticise Mannheim for a lack of analytical precision that was unattainable in his day or for being pre-occupied with spurious problems when these seemed, at the time, genuine enough. But as regards the first point, even when the essays in question first appeared, much more precise and sophisticated methods of analysis had already been devised, by such sociologists as Durkheim, Pareto, Simmel, and, especially, Max Weber. And as regards the second point, let me simply note that in many ways Mannheim's whole approach is dated and his extensive critique of other scholars, e.g. Hegel, Schelling, Adam Muller, or the German *geisteswissenschaftliche* school) only of historical interest. Nor finally will the evidence he cites, mostly German sources of the 'twenties or older, carry much weight with the modern reader.

To some extent this is true also of Mannheim's later writings, such as the odd little essay on "The Sociological Nature of Human Valuations" (1936), in which he attempts to explain the occupational hierarchy in a Scottish industrial town with reference to medieval German practices and to some *curiosa* assembled in a German publication of 1863. But let me turn to the last (and latest) contribution in the volume, Mannheim's Oxford lectures on "Planned Society and Human Personality" (1938).

If the Sociology of Knowledge represents Mannheim's foremost interest, the sociology of "planning" undoubtedly comes next. The link between the two will readily be seen. For the fact that social practice can produce its own buttresses in the form of "defensive" ideologies and congenial "ways of thought" has its corollary in the possibility that through the manipulation of ideologies and "ways of thought" the social practice can be hardened and secured. No planning can entirely dispense with this manipulation of the intellectual environment into which people are born and by which they remain "conditioned." The question is how far dare we go without destroying the spontaneity of human existence and man's freedom of thought and action. The central theme of the lectures is thus the conflict between "liberalism" (in the widest sense of the word) and "planned society."

For Mannheim, these two ways of social life are not alternatives between which we are free to choose. As we stand to-day we cannot reject or disregard either, and hence must face up to a true conflict or dilemma, for which human ingenuity must find a solution. A realistic student of history, Mannheim has no illusions about the survival of liberalism. "The longer we study present-day society the less we can avoid seeing that all the basic conceptions of the age of liberalism are vanishing" (p. 256). And again—"If anything is clear, it is that there is no way back to an unplanned society any longer" (p. 307). Yet if "the possibilities of planning are great, the dangers are greater" (p. 309); and though the "free society" so-called may not be quite the ideal it often is made out to be, it is yet better than the completely planned society, based on coercion and dictatorship. The answer, then, must be a compromise—a "more considerate conception of planning," employing interference only where it is necessary, resting not on commands but on "spontaneity," and never encroaching upon the ultimate privacy of the individual.

Few are likely to quarrel with this thesis. But one cannot help wondering if it warrants the elaborate "social psychological" analysis which is presented in evidence and which lacks real forcefulness: the reviewer, at least, could make little of the vague postulate of a "sociological self" or the naive attempt to contrast two methods of moulding personality—through guiding the individual (the "liberal" way), and through shaping his "environment" (the totalitarian method). Behind it all is clearly the old idea of a rational ethics, whose tenets should be capable of objective proof and demonstrable by the sheer force of logic. Whether such proofs and demon-

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strations are possible, I must leave to philosophers. Certainly, Mannheim's thesis is not convincing on that score. It convinces because his moral philosophy is also ours and because the values he defends are also those we accept as commonsense truths. Nor can one miss the passionate sincerity of his belief, passionate because so closely bound up with his personal fate, in a society neither coercive nor incoherent, neither like the Germany from which Mannheim fled into exile in 1933, nor like the Germany before that, when "planlessness" prepared the way not for freedom but servitude.

Perhaps this is the best summing-up of the essays presented in this book: they are documents of historical insight, philosophic intuition, and of moral faith, more than studies in scientific sociology as we to-day understand the term. Put differently, Mannheim still stands for the early conception of sociology, as a branch of learning hardly yet separated from the parent disciplines history and philosophy. In Mannheim's view, this is as it should be—"Every sociology is ultimately derived from a philosophy of history" (p. 214). The new milieu of England where Mannheim lived and taught from 1933 until his death, and his growing familiarity with British empiricism and American pragmatism, did make some impact upon his later writings. There, he readily accepts the empirical and practical trend of modern sociology and the need for specialised, detailed research. Yet by temperament, though not by intent, Mannheim remained of the old school. If in his final vision he did outline a new "scientific" discipline of society, he was a little like Moses who saw the promised land but did not set foot in it. Even so, the vision counts. It counts, especially, in a country like Australia where all too few share it. And Australians, whose universities have stubbornly (or indolently?) failed to admit sociology as a subject worth teaching, might well ponder this message, taken from his lecture on "The Place of Sociology"—

"Therefore I venture to assert that as long as in our research work and in our school and academic curricula we do not introduce sociology as a basic science, so long shall we not be good specialists—let alone be able to educate a generation of citizens on whose correct understanding of the functioning of society in which they live it must depend whether the social process is in future to be guided by reason or unreason."

—S. F. NADEL.

ISRAEL BETWEEN EAST AND WEST—A study in human relations: By Raphael Patai. The Jewish Publication Society of America, Philadelphia, 5713-1953. 24 pages, illustrated.

The new-old state of Israel seems bound to continue the tradition of its people to collect all antagonistic forces of a time as if in a small burning-mirror. After having established itself against momentous diplomatic odds and defended the economically frailest of structures against the onslaught of a league of some of the most famous warrior tribes, the nascent nation finds itself rent internally by an antagonism which arises wherever East and West meet, but is here infinitely more poignant because in Israel the representatives of Oriental and Occidental ways of life do not face each other as natives and aliens, conquerors and conquered, but belong to the same race which has always been regarded as singularly homogeneous, well-knit and one-minded.

Curiously enough neither the nature nor the magnitude of the conflict appears to have been foreseen by the pathmakers and founders of Israel. It arose out of the decision (following from both the idea of Zionism and the logic of strategy) to open the country to every Jew who asked for citizenship; and out of the technological conditions of modern transport which made it possible to convey in a few hours the whole Jewish population of Irak, South Arabia and Morocco to the soil of their messianic hopes where they now equal the numbers of earlier settlers from central and eastern Europe and will, with their much higher birthrates under much improved hygienic conditions, soon outnumber them, thus threatening to drown their Western ways of thinking, feeling, acting in a sea of Oriental ways of life. Never was there a family reunion of such baffling implications. To the typical representatives of Western-bred Israelis who have built and buttressed the new state, the Oriental newcomers appear to share with them nothing but mythico-historical memories, being devoid of most qualities and standards, social, intellectual, economic and political which are deemed indispensable to civilised life and national self-preservation according to the requirements of progress and security as "modern man" conceives and cherishes them. To the Oriental newcomers the situation is still more bewildering. They are, in the concise formula of Professor Patai, "Arabs in everything except in religion." In the Moslem countries they have been discriminated against, despised and oppressed for nothing but this, their religion. They now find themselves in the midst of fellow-Jews who are atheist or to whom religion does not matter greatly, and to whom they consequently feel spiritually superior while they are themselves in danger of sinking to the level of an ethnic proletariat of the well-known "Levantine" type—provided they are not thoroughly and quickly "assimilated" by the efficient, but to them presumably, not very lovable methods of mass-education through trade-union and army discipline.

Professor Patai analyses this conflict-situation lucidly, comprehensively and with great fairness on all its levels, demographic, economic, political and cultural, in much significant detail but with the firm hands of the "social anthropologist" trained in Middle East studies and who has—alas, in vain—tried to acclimatise his discipline in Israel and had to seek an academic haven in the United States.

Not the least attraction of the book is the photographs showing a delectable diversity of physiognomic types of Israelis of various origins. By far the most attractive appear to be those coming from Yemen, with noble, fierce, yet delicate features of men and women who are now regarded as the most patient workers and the most artistically gifted members of their new-old nation. It is pleasing to think that they come from those regions of South Arabia where Moses took his wife and according to some, found much to learn, and to feel that the physiognomies are most easy to associate with figures of the Old Testament. Let us hope that this race within the race will survive the hardships of steam-roller "acculturation" and produce in some happier future poets and law-givers in the furnace of whose minds the genuine encounter of East and West will happen of which some Western thinkers of their tribe have dreamt.

—KURT SINGER.

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**THE NEMESIS OF POWER — The German Army in Politics,
1918-1945, by John W. Wheeler-Bennett. London,
Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 829 pp.**

"IS there a new spirit abroad in Germany or is this merely 'where we came in' in the repetitive history of the German army in politics?" With this anxious and by no means academic question Mr. Wheeler-Bennett concludes his important survey of the political role played by the German generals from the defeat in World War I to the collapse of the Hitler regime at the end of the Second.¹ Whilst approving of the rearmament of Western Germany, though not without some audible misgivings, he feels that "we should be doing less than our duty and even a positive disservice to posterity, if in our anxiety to make secure the future, we were to forget or even to ignore the lessons of the past."

It is a long and grim story, depressing for any but the Macchiavellian reader, unfolded with much skill and with considerable narrative power. It is not only based on the study of a wealth of primary and secondary sources, some of the former like the diaries of Generals Jodl and Halder so far unpublished, but also on the contacts the author had during the earlier period under review with leading personalities like Groener and Bruening. One feels that he had lived in Germany during the political crisis which led from the ill-fated Weimar Republic to the beginnings of the Hitler regime, an acute observer in the wings with a playful sense of irony, perhaps more at home in the august circles of the Herrenklub than at the drab meetings of the Social Democrats. As an English Tory he has become the most outspoken critic of the German conservatives who "more influenced by feelings of disloyalty to the Republic than of loyalty to the Kaiser" helped to dig the grave of the Weimar regime and to instal Hitler, only to find before long that they had become his tools and prisoners.

Mr. Wheeler-Bennett has further relied on a number of memoranda, especially written for him by persons close to the events or in the entourage of its main actors. One of them is the son of a former Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Colonel-General Kurt von Hammerstein, who, having shown much ineptitude during the fateful days of January 1933, was later in retirement to become an unwavering opponent of the Hitler regime. An eye-witness of a later period who placed his material at the disposal of the author is Dr. Otto John, one of the few survivors among the plotters of July 20th, 1944, a man who recently gained world-wide attention through his defection as Head of the West German Security Service to Communist controlled East Germany.¹

In the first two parts of his book the author gives us a penetrating political history of the Republic from the point of view of the relations of the Army on the one hand with the existing regime, on the other, with the National Socialist movement. Whilst he does not offer any startling revelations he guides us brilliantly through the labyrinth of a very complex development.²

It began on November 9, 1918, with secret telephone conversations between the first post-Imperial Chancellor Ebert in Berlin and General Groener, speaking for the Supreme Command of the Army, in Spa. In this way a pact was concluded between a defeated army and a quasi-revolutionary regime, "a pact destined to save both parties from the extreme elements of revolution, as a result of which the

1. The recent activities of Dr. John do not, however, automatically destroy or minimise the value of his statements on events which took place ten or twelve years ago. Moreover, these were apparently written for the author, before Dr. John took up his post-war job in Bonn in 1949.

2. A few factual mistakes to be found in some of the innumerable footnotes have been pointed out by a critic in England. They will, doubtless, be corrected in subsequent editions. Perhaps the most serious error occurs on p. 19, footnote 2, where Ebert is described as "last Imperial Chancellor of Germany (November 1918—February 1919)" and as "President of the National Assembly (February 1919—March 1920)." The last Imperial Chancellor was, Prince Max von Baden and Ebert was never President of the National Assembly. On p. 787 the year of the death of Field Marshal von Blomberg is given as 1943 instead of 1946. On p. 112 the proper translation of von Seeckt's words as quoted by von Bock, "Sind anzugreifen" should run: "Go for them" (not "go for him.").

Weimar Republic was doomed at birth." In those chaotic November days Groener showed much more intelligence and courage than his chief, Field Marshal von Hindenburg, who had a knack of passing unpleasant responsibilities on to others. Altogether Hindenburg was to prove "a small Prussian Junker and a German myth," to use the apt phrase of a French historian.

One of the main insights to be gained from this book is the fact that the German Army had its greatest influence in the earlier days of the Republic when it was small and without conscripts, under the resourceful leadership of von Seeckt. He made the Army a state within the state, a *Fuehrerarmee* staffing the Reichswehr of 100,000 men permitted by the Peace Treaty with 40,000 carefully selected non-commissioned officers, as a nucleus for the officer corps of a larger army of the future. Seeckt, clever "sphinx with a riddle," also managed to circumvent the taboos set up by the Peace Treaty through clandestinely building up the so-called "Black Reichswehr." He further made secret arrangements with the Soviet Russian authorities in the wake of the Treaty of Rapallo by which his troops were furnished with thousands of Russian shells, and facilities were provided for the training of his officers in military aeronautics and tank warfare on Russian soil. Deliberately keeping out of Party politics the Reichswehr under von Seeckt proved a stabilising factor in a semi-democracy.

Afterwards its power gradually diminished when the generals started "to play politics rather than to dominate them" under the arch-intriguer Kurt von Schleicher who managed to gain the ear of von Hindenburg, elected Reich President in 1925. "The evil genius of the later Weimar Period"—Mr. Wheeler-Bennett calls Schleicher—"symbolising all the worst traits of the general in politics." Dreaming of an army dictatorship and exploiting the paralysis from which the Reichstag then suffered, he successively made and unmade Chancellors, first Bruening, then von Papen and finally—himself.

With the 30th January, 1933, the relationship "the Army and Hitler" changed to "Hitler and the Army," a theme which forms the third and longest part of this work. At first the Army managed to remain independent, but only as long as Hindenburg was alive. Once Hitler had succeeded him, both as Head of the State and as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, the generals were to experience little gratitude from the former corporal.

The two decisive turning-points in the history of Hitler's relations with the Army were to be 1938 and 1944. Until 1938 the Army appears to have remained "the final arbiter of the political destinies of the Reich . . . Well knowing what they did they had accepted Hitler as Chief of State and had pledged their loyalty to him personally, as their Supreme Commander, always with the reservation that at their own good pleasure they could unmake the Caesar they had made." It was the sordid Fritsch-Blomberg crisis of 1938, culminating in the manufactured dismissal in disgrace of the Minister of War, Field Marshal von Blomberg, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Colonel-General von Fritsch, which acted as an eye-opener to at least some of the senior members of the *Generallitae*. They then realised, too late, that they had lost the magic formula with which to force the daemonic genie of Hitlerism back into the bottle from which it had been released with their approval. Whilst the majority of army leaders continued to follow the ever more successful Fuehrer, (partly because he provided them with honours, field marshal batons and estates), there were a few men like General Beck who now realised the gambling madness of Hitler's drift of war, a war which they thought the armed German forces were unable to win in the long run. Such people as Beck and Goerdeler, a former Lord Mayor of Leipzig, wanted a return to the rules of law, of a *Rechtsstaat* and to the principle of "Prussian cleanliness and simplicity." Shortly before Munich they planned the arrest of Hitler and the setting-up of a provisional Government. These plans for a *coup d'état* were largely based on the assumption that an attack by Germany would lead to a general war. The conspirators even sent an envoy, Herr von Kleist, to London early in August 1938, where he had unofficial talks with Sir Robert Vansittart, then Chief Diplomatic Advisor to the British Government, and with Mr. Churchill, then only an M.P.³ The German visitor, who

3. Interesting documents in connection with these interviews have been published in vol. II, Third Series of Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939, pp. 683-689 (London 1949).

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without exaggeration could say that he had "come out of Germany with a rope round his neck to stake his last chance of life," pressed for a reaffirmation of the determination of England and France to intervene if Germany should attack Czechoslovakia. He suggested also that some leading British statesman should address himself "to the German Army and to other disgruntled elements within the Reich emphasizing the horror of war and the inevitable catastrophe to which it would lead." The only concrete achievement Herr von Kleist seems to have been able to obtain was a letter from Mr. Churchill to the conspirators (whose number was small but included Admiral Canaris, head of the *Abwehr*, the Military Intelligence Branch) giving it as his personal opinion that "England will march with France" and "that the spectacle of an armed attack by Germany upon a small neighbour and the bloody fighting that will follow will rouse the whole British Empire and compel the gravest decisions."⁴

Mr. Wheeler-Bennett rejects the legend recently sponsored in some circles in Germany that the attempt to remove Hitler was frustrated when Mr. Chamberlain decided to go to Munich on September 28, 1938; "There is evidence indeed that any plans which had existed for a Putsch had been abandoned at least a fortnight before, at the time of Mr. Chamberlain's first flight to Germany." Ineptitude in planning and a Hamlet-like reluctance in execution, an attitude also characteristic of most of the later attempts of the plotters — led to the abandonment of the project; "they hesitated until the visitation of Mr. Chamberlain to Germany cut the ground from under their feet."

A year afterwards on the eve of World War II the chances of a military revolt to prevent Hitler from going to war were slight. Though again contacts with London were made through secret emissaries such as Adam zu Trott, Helmuth von Moltke and Erich Kordt, they came to naught. The attempts to prevent the war planned by a determined *Fuehrer* failed, largely because during the decisive last days of August 1939, Hadler, Chief of the German General Staff and von Brauchitsch, Commander-in-Chief of the Army, who both knew of and condoned the planned anti-Hitler conspiracy, remained completely passive. Later Hadler put the strange excuse forward that "it was necessary to have a war to bring down Hitler and his regime of evil immediately after the first defeat." The fact that Hitler and Ribbentrop set on having their war, had brought off a Non-Aggression Treaty with Soviet Russia, undoubtedly helped to make that war more palatable to the *Generalituet*. At least their nightmare of a war to be fought on two fronts had vaporised. Only one of the conspirators, Admiral Canaris, had no illusions: "This means the end of Germany" he said, when war was declared, "in a voice of tears."

Hitler's phenomenal successes in the spring and summer of 1940 ending with the collapse of France silenced the opposition. It was slowly revived after the invasion of Russia in summer 1941 did not prove to be the expected walk-over but instead led to severe German losses in the vast plains of a country unsuited to a successful *Blitzkrieg*. It needed, however, the Allied landings in North Africa and the disaster of the Sixth German Army in Stalingrad early in 1943 to cause a change of attitude in some of the generals who had followed Hitler so far unquestioningly. They now felt the first duty of the army was loyalty to its self-preservation rather than to a self-styled *Generalissimo*, who had a knack of moving and discarding generals like pawns on a chessboard. For Hitler, Stalingrad intensified his hatred and contempt for the generals—had not von Paulus surrendered with the remnants of the Sixth Army after Hitler had announced his promotion to the rank of Field-Marshal? Yet some of the top-rank military leaders were reluctant to join the conspiracy, they remained sitting on the fence not wanting to commit themselves until the anti-Hitler plot had proved successful. One of these men was General von Kluge, vacillating and unreliable to the very end. In a pathetic letter written on June 25, 1943, Goerdeler tried to prod him into action. After furnishing a grim picture of the devastating effect of Allied mass bombing on the towns of the Ruhr and on Cologne he asserted that there was still the possibility of concluding a favourable peace "if we Germans again make ourselves capable of taking action . . . I can tell you that I can win over to you,

4. The original of this letter was found by the Gestapo in von Kleist's country house after his arrest in the wake of the plot of 20th July, 1944, and this led to his execution a few weeks before the end of the war.

Field-Marshal, and to any other general resolved to take the necessary action, the overwhelming majority of the German working class, the German Civil Service and the German business world . . . Therefore all that is required is decision, bold thinking and right action. What is most dangerous and in the end unbearable is to shut one's ears day after day to the voice of conscience." But **kluger Hans** informed the all too sanguine Goerdeler that he was simply "not interested". However, by then the number of civilians determined to put an end to a shameful and ruinous regime had grown, though in their ranks considerable differences existed as to the aims and aspirations of a post-Hitler government. There was the so-called Kreisau circle round broad-minded young aristocrats like Helmuth von Moltke⁵ and Peter York von Wartenburg, who managed to build up wide contacts throughout Germany, extending to Social Democrats and to the two Christian Churches. Yet with their blend of Prussian mysticism and Prussian Christian Socialism most members of this group confined themselves to passive resistance refusing to join in the plans of the Beck-Goerdeler group to overthrow the regime by assassinating Hitler. Goerdeler, described by Mr. Wheeler-Bennett as "a cross between a pedagogue, an alderman and a civil servant," visualised a parliamentary system on the English model with a monarchical presidency. Being in favour of a cabinet in which all classes, all religions, all German Laender would be represented, his ideals were akin to those of a Tory democracy.⁶

A much younger and more dynamic personality was Colonel Claus Schenck von Stauffenberg, Chief-of-Staff to the Commander-in-Chief, Home Army, the man who on 20th July, 1944, placed a leather case containing a bomb in the barracks in Hitler's Headquarters during his daily war conference. This daring and cultured scion of an old aristocratic and Catholic South German family, badly maimed in the North African campaign, was much further to the Left than Goerdeler and his friends. During the war Stauffenberg struck up a friendship with a spirited Socialist, Julius Leber, in whom he saw a future German chancellor. Their motives in joining the conspiracy were not the same as those of the non-political Erwin Rommel, Hitler's most famous general, who as a soldier wanted to save the German army and as a patriot the future existence of the Reich.

In one of the best chapters of this book we are given a masterly picture of the dramatic events of the 20th July and of their tragic repercussions, as they occurred simultaneously in the **Wolfsschanze**, Hitler's headquarters in East Prussia, in Berlin and in Paris, where incidentally some of the rebellious German officers showed more pluck and presence of mind than elsewhere. The astonishing survival of Hitler owing to a number of incidental technical circumstances could not have been foreseen, but the fact that one of the top conspirators in the **Wolfsschanze**, General Feldgiebel, failed lamentably in his task was to prove disastrous. Contrary to the planning, he did not put the communication lines at the Fuehrer's headquarters out of action, and the fact that various Party and military leaders in Berlin could therefore soon ascertain by phone that Hitler was still alive contributed much to the failure of the revolt. Hitler's terrible and inhuman revenge on his enemies and even on their families is well known, but the factual account given here does much to underline it. The historian should consider, however, not only what happened and why it happened as it did, but also what might have happened. Applied to this case, he has to ask what would have been the consequences of a successful **coup d'état**. Even had the Putsch ended with Hitler's death, "the result," says Mr. Wheeler-Bennett, "would have been chaotic." There would have been a bitter struggle for the leadership of the Party and the Reich, there might have been clashes between some fanatical Nazi generals and the military supporters of a new regime. In other words, civil war would have been likely. It is by no means certain if men of such divergent views as Goerdeler, Chancellor-designate

5. There is an English translation of the moving last letters written by Count Helmuth James von Moltke during his months in prison before his execution: **A German of the Resistance**, Oxford University Press, second edition, 1947.

6. In vain did Goerdeler try to establish, by way of his Swedish friends, the bankers Wallenberg, channels of co-operation with the British Government, then committed to a policy of "Unconditional Surrender." At a time when Moscow pressed for the early establishment of a "Second Front," the British Government was not in a position to take more than a platonic interest in these approaches, particularly as the strength and effectiveness of the German resistance groups seemed indeed doubtful.

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in the Provisional Government, Leber, his Minister of the Interior, and the revolutionary von Stauffenberg, State-Secretary for War, would have agreed to differ and to follow a joint constructive line. Moreover, what attitude would the Army have taken towards such a Cabinet?

Had the new anti-Nazi Government been able to establish itself and to enter into peace negotiations with the West, undoubtedly many thousands of lives, military and civilian, on both sides would have been saved and some Germans of ability and moral strength would have been able to devote themselves to the peaceful reconstruction of their country instead of meeting with a horrible death from Hitler's hangmen.

From the Allied point of view, the situation would, however, have been fraught with new difficulties. Mr. Wheeler-Bennett suggests that "one must not allow a sense of humanity, nor of historical hindsight, to obfuscate political vision." Indeed to have negotiated a peace with any German Government—and particularly one which had sprung into existence as a result of a military revolt—"would have been to abandon our declared aim of destroying German militarism." Moreover, had the new Government shown a preference for the Western Powers and tried to cold-shoulder the Soviet Union, a sharp tension between the latter and the West might have developed. Also the legend of an undefeated Germany, so popular in the Reich after 1918, would probably have gone the rounds a second time. Mr. Wheeler-Bennett could have pointed to the deep-rooted antinomy facing the historian and his judgments in such cases. The political and the humane points of view do not necessarily coincide. From the political angle of the West it was probably "better" that the Third Reich lasted to its bitter end, to the Unconditional Surrender of the German armies in the schoolhouse of Reims and to the formal recognition by them of its total defeat. From a humane point of view, however, one must deplore the wasting of so many valuable lives on both sides, including those of the plotters themselves.

Perhaps Mr. Wheeler-Bennett does not altogether do justice to the desperate situation in which these plotters found themselves. It is true that in the long run they paid for the sins which they or their fathers, most of them German conservatives, had committed earlier by their disloyalty to the Republic and by their astounding blindness to the sinister aspects of the Nazi movement. Yet, as has been said aptly, "they were confronted with the worst dilemma which can face the professional man, that which arises from the identification of the nation he loves with a government whose aims he applauds but whose methods he detests."⁷

History does not repeat itself but it leaves behind powerful traditions. The tradition of German militarism is not an invention of historians or propagandists. Now when Western German armament had been decided upon, the question becomes imperative: will the German generals of to-morrow be different from those of yesterday? Will the military forces this time be subordinated to the State instead of dominating it, or becoming an obedient tool in the hands of sinister authoritarian interests?

The next few years may be decisive in that respect. "A German national army trained by and in charge of Hitler officers," the distinguished German philosopher Karl Jaspers recently told the Americans,⁸ "would I think, be unreliable. I fear it as a German, and I understand the fear of others. What has happened before should not be forgotten. The right road to German rearmament is to be found only by German democrats. I am convinced that they exist . . . I believe everybody should realise that this is not just one problem among others, but that with it the future of German democracy, of German freedom and of German integration in the Western world will be decided."

Only the future will show if on this vital problem the men of the West have been able to learn anything from bitter experience. Only then will it be possible to say if the fighters against the Hitler tyranny, both in the Allied camp and among the German opposition, have not died in vain.

—E. BRAMSTED

7. D. C. Watt, "Sir Lewis Namier and Contemporary European History," *The Cambridge Journal*, vol. VII, No. 10, July, 1954, p. 599.

8. Karl Jaspers, "The Political Vacuum in Germany," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 32, No. 4, July 1954, pp. 606-7.

CENTRAL EUROPEAN DEMOCRACY AND ITS BACKGROUND

— Economic and political group organisation. By Rudolph Schlesinger. (Routledge and Kegan Paul) London, 1953. pp. 402. Price, 30s. (stg.)

Dr. Schlesinger's purpose in this scholarly work is to account for the collapse of parliamentary democracy in Germany, Austria and Czechoslovakia. He believes that the reasons for this collapse offer a warning to other countries, that the dangers which he outlines apply to modern mass democracy in general.

His view is that this collapse cannot be ascribed to external factors, such as the consequences of a lost war or the aftermath of the Great Depression. He demonstrates fairly convincingly that specific institutional arrangements such as Proportional Representation, the party system, or certain constitutional provisions, were of minor importance.

For him the basic reasons are inherent in the nature of the modern democratic movement itself. And it is his contention that, in Central Europe at any rate, and probably elsewhere (he is rather cagey on this point) the democratic movement must be identified with the labour movement. The book thus turns out to be an examination of the growth and strategy of the mass organisations of the workers and peasants in Central Europe which grew up with the industrialisation of the region.

The labour parties and trade unions were, on the whole, fundamentally reformist and sectional. They were content to work within a given socio-economic framework which they never seriously challenged. Their failure to do so meant the perpetuation of control of the state by forces which were hostile to parliamentary democracy. At the same time, the labour movement entered into coalitions with these forces. Its failure to challenge them meant that it really existed on sufferance and lacked real power. At the same time, being committed to support the status quo it was saddled with responsibility for the anti-working class policies of its unnatural allies.

The author gives a very detailed and extremely interesting survey of the specific sectional demands of the labour mass organisations. Their strength rested on being the only organisations which were able to stand for and realise such demands. But there was no necessary monopoly—once the labour movement dropped its combatant attitude, most of the demands could be put into practice by any government, including a Fascist one. Their realisation did not mean a fundamental social revolution. Hence, the labour movement gradually atrophied by losing the monopoly of certain functions which were taken over by the State: "The plain lesson of the record seems to be that the sectional mass movement, unless it gives birth to something which outgrows its limitations, is incapable of creating the setting in which its inherent potentialities can develop."

The general thesis is hardly very novel. A very similar analysis occurs in Sturmtal's *The Tragedy of European Labour* though from the analysis itself nothing much follows as to what ought to have been done. To Dr. Schlesinger, the Labour parties either ought to have conquered state power or else, at least, ought to have kept free of entangling alliances. But, given the fact, which Dr. Schlesinger does not deny, that these parties on the whole did not "betray" their followers, it is difficult to see how they could have acted otherwise than they did. The author is really committed to the view, though he does not say so openly, that a democratic revolution from above was a possibility after World War I especially in Germany. He gives no evidence for this contention.

Moreover, there are really two basically inconsistent points of view in this book. On the one hand, Dr. Schlesinger holds fast to a peculiar contention which he has repeated in all his works and in his articles in *Soviet Studies*. He believes that it makes no sense to criticise "the policies of a political party from any

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standpoint other than that of its own principles." But, as he shows himself, the "principles" of the sectional mass organisations certainly did not include either a revolution or a refusal to enter a coalition government. Dr. Schlesinger is thus forced to argue that the principles ought to have been different from what they were. He constantly shifts to and fro between these two positions.

However, it is possible to appreciate the very interesting discussion of the specific sectional demands of the Labour parties given here without agreeing with the general thesis. Based on a very full survey of the literature, and on personal experience, this survey of the specific policies forms the most valuable part of the work. It does raise far-reaching general questions as to the relations between trade union and labour party demands and the evolution of the modern State.

—HENRY MAYER.

**MOTURIKI — A pilot project in community development,
By Howard Hayden. Published under the auspices of the
South Pacific Commission. Oxford University Press,
Melbourne, 1954. 42s.**

In 1948 the Fijian Government accepted an invitation by the South Pacific Commission to carry out a community development project under the sponsorship of the Commission. The arrangement was that the project should be administered and staffed by the Fijian Government, which would meet the cost of the salaries of seconded personnel, while the remainder of the cost, including equipment and training cost would be met by the South Pacific Commission. The project was conceived as a 'pilot project' to be carried on only for a limited time. In fact, the period of work from the first inspection of the chosen site to the withdrawal of the development team was only from January, 1950 to December, 1951.

The area chosen was the island of Moturiki; quite a good choice as a testing ground for community development in the Pacific because it offered a combination of fairly unfavourable conditions which occur very generally, for example: a small population (588 persons) with a small average cash income (£38/8/ per family) derived mainly from the sale of copra, generally backward and unprogressive, and with limited possibilities of economic improvement by reason of restricted natural resources and transport problems.

The instrument of the project was a Team working under an Advisory Group led by the author of this book, who was Director of Education. The Team consisted of Fijian personnel; it was led by an Assistant Inspector of Schools, Eliki Seru, and included an assistant nurse, an agricultural field assistant, a hand-crafts and homecraft instructress, an instructor in carpentry and house building, an assistant filariasis inspector and a forest guard. The main purpose of the Team was to stimulate action by the local community itself, and to assist such action in appropriate ways. Everything therefore depended on the degree of success in developing a local community leadership capable of initiative and responsibility.

It was not until August, 1950, after initial survey and planning work by the Team and the Advisory Group that a general meeting of the community was called to elect a Development Committee. Great difficulty was experienced in finding a suitable Chairman. The first was judged to be lacking in experience and ability and was persuaded to resign; the second one elected by the people was a man recently in trouble through misappropriation of island funds (not an especially serious matter in Fijian eyes) and was also persuaded to resign. The

original Chairman was then asked to carry on provisionally, and did so until in the following year, when a general meeting re-elected the **second** Chairman, and this time the Advisory Group thought it wise not to press for his resignation.

In the sixteen months of the project's active realisation, a number of lines of development were tried, for instance: a copra marketing scheme, rice-growing, afforestation, a health clinic and general health programme, school milk supply, water supply, housebuilding, crafts for women, carpentry for men, a boys' camp, school building.

It is not easy to give a fair verdict on the experiment. The results in most of these lines of activity were unsatisfactory. It is interesting that 'the most successful and lasting results were obtained from work with the women' (p.133), who benefited from the maternity service of the clinic and from the crafts training which gave them a new source of income.

Hayden's own conclusions seem the proper ones to be drawn, and it may be of interest to summarise them briefly. He emphasises the value of the approach to development through a Team, providing that the leader has the combination of knowledge and leadership required. He regards training as very important, not only for the Team but also for the local leadership. He stresses the value of an initial survey on the basis of which realistic planning may be made. He records the opinion 'that even in a long term project some early and rapid manifestation of what can be achieved by community development affords a valuable incentive' (p.131). He notes that one weakness of the project was that since it was conceived and carried out by specialist technical officers and not by administrative officers, when the Team withdrew the administration was insufficiently in touch with what had been going on and there was little follow-up.

Finally, Hayden puts his finger on the chief failure of the experiment: it so happened that in the community chosen there were no natural leaders for this kind of work (p.129) and when the Team withdrew it left no cadre of local leaders willing and trained to carry on for themselves. He speaks in this connection of the need for training and follow up; but perhaps the proper lesson is that the initial survey should have regard to the presence or absence of suitable leadership elements, and that **no community development scheme should be initiated unless such elements exist.**

The author deserves to be complimented on a well-presented report which will be most useful to all concerned with improving the general standard of living of the island communities.

—JAMES McAULEY.

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THE HISTORIAN'S CRAFT: Marc Bloch. Manchester University Press, 1954. Pp. xxi Plus 197. 12/6.

This wise and stimulating book is a translation of a work by a well-known French medievalist, who was Professor of Economic History at the Sorbonne in 1939. The circumstances under which it was written are in themselves likely to attract attention. Bloch wrote it in the period between the fall of France and his capture as a member of the Resistance in 1944. When he was shot by the Nazis a few months later, the work was unfinished; several chapters were unwritten, while others suggest that the author had not fully recorded the ideas at which he hints. The work as it now stands, however, more than justifies the decision to publish an English translation. Its distinction lies not so much in an outstanding originality in the raising of new questions or even in the re-examination of old ones, but in the quality of the scholarship, the sound historical sense and the broadly cultured mind of which it is the product. Here is no manual for methodologists. But there are true riches in the contact with a great craftsman, retaining amid disaster his faith in his craft and reflecting upon the principles which had guided him through many years of fruitful work.

The work was commenced, as the writer explains in a foreword, "as a simple anti-dote by which, amid sorrows and anxieties both personal and collective, I seek a little peace of mind." There is much in it to suggest that Bloch found solace and a renewal of his faith in history as "the science of men in time," as he reflected in turn upon the nature and use of history and the distinctive features of historical observation and analysis, and historical causation. If he found peace of mind, in writing, it was not through immersing himself in the more remote periods with which he had been concerned as teacher and scholar. For Bloch was convinced that "the faculty of understanding the living is, in very truth, the master quality of the historian" and that in history we are required to "join the study of the dead and the living." He had no sympathy with those who "spare Clio's chastity from the profanation of present controversy." That he himself possessed to a striking degree this sense of the unity of human experience is clear. His illustrations are drawn as much from events of recent years as from the centuries with which he was familiar as a writer of history. The serenity and detachment of outlook which are so marked in this work came not from withdrawal from present conflicts but from grappling with them and seeing them in the perspective of history.

For historians the value of the work lies in its challenge to them to re-examine the assumptions and practices of their craft. On these Bloch has much to say that is sensible and often penetrating. His plea for imaginative writing, whose inspiration comes as much from sympathetic and lively insight into human nature and the diversity of human experience as from documentary research, will repay careful reading, together with his discussion of technical points, such as the evaluation of evidence and nomenclature. At times historians may feel that he has scarcely come to grips with some of the issues in current methodological discussion. He suggests, for instance, that we should be able "to lay aside our own ego" in order to "plumb the consciousness of another person, separated . . . by the interval of generations," but the extent to which it is in fact possible for historians to have knowledge of the thoughts and emotions of the individuals of whom they write is not explored. Criticisms of the book on the grounds of its omissions might be developed, but their application to the author is halted by the recollection of the incomplete state of the work.

Bloch, moreover, was not writing "exclusively or even chiefly, for the private use of the guild." His purpose was equally to acquaint others with the nature of the historian's work. In this respect, *The Historian's Craft* should be of general interest and value, particularly if the reading of it removes some of the popular misconceptions about a subject which is, as Bloch is at pains to stress, a "newcomer in the field of rational knowledge," despite its long ancestry.

—MARJORIE JACOBS.

CORRESPONDENCE

5 Torresdale Road,
Toorak.

The Editor,
The Australian Outlook,
Sydney.

Dear Sir,

In my article on the late Sir Frederic Eggleston, which appeared in your December issue, I referred to his membership of the Australian Grants Commission. No other obituary notice that has come to my attention makes any reference to the fact; nor, surprisingly enough, is it mentioned in the 1950 edition of "Who's Who in Australia."

You will perhaps permit me, therefore, to quote a remark made in a recent letter to me by the present chairman of the Commonwealth Grants Commission, Sir Alex Fitzgerald. Pointing out that Eggleston was chairman of the Commission from its inception in July, 1933, until November, 1941, Sir Alex goes on to say: "I need hardly add that as the first chairman he did a magnificent job in establishing the principles upon which the Commission has acted ever since."

Yours faithfully,
T. N. Buesst.

16 March, 1955.

